Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hinkley Point B Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd's (NGL's) Hinkley Point B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The following interventions were carried out:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

The civil engineering structures (sea defences, stacks, and pipe bridges) were judged to meet the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

We carried out a system based inspection of civil engineering structures on site (sea defences, stacks, and pipe bridges) at Hinkley Point B power station and concluded that:

For LC10 (training): we were satisfied with the arrangements that were in place to ensure that civil engineering work on site was undertaken by individuals with suitable and sufficient qualifications and training. We considered that these arrangements will be further enhanced when a full-time, site-based, civil engineer has been recruited. We concluded that the implementation of the arrangements for training was satisfactory based upon those individuals sampled. We therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3 (adequate) to this inspection.

For LC23 (operating rules): we noted that, due to their nature, the civil structures did not have any specific operating rules or Technical Specifications associated with them. One general Technical Specification (concerning action to be taken during periods of high wind) was examined and this was judged to be satisfactory. We therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3 (adequate) for this inspection.

For LC24 (operating instructions): we reviewed operating instructions relating to civil structures including branch instructions for the inspection of structures and facilities, technical guidance notes, company standards and a number of completed Work Order Cards containing specific task instructions. We were satisfied that site had followed procedures and developed instructions which covered a range of tasks. We therefore assigned an IIS Rating of - 3, (adequate) to this inspection.

For LC27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits): overall we were satisfied that the civil engineering structures were being appropriately addressed as safety mechanisms. We therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3 (adequate) to this inspection.

For LC28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing): we examined documentation relating to a number of civil structures on site and this provided sufficient evidence that satisfactory arrangements were in place. We therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3 (adequate) to this inspection.

For LC34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste): we judged that this did not apply to the civil buildings sampled on this occasion (sea defences, stacks and pipe bridges) because they did not include radioactive material

Overall, we judged that the civil engineering structures (sea defences, stacks, and pipe bridges) met the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.

For LC11 (emergency arrangements): an ONR team witnessed the annual level 1 demonstration exercise and we concluded that this was a satisfactory demonstration of the station's emergency arrangements. We therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3, (adequate) to this inspection.

For LC30 (periodic shutdown): I reviewed the preparations that were being made as part of the next statutory reactor outage. I was satisfied that satisfactory arrangements were in place and I assigned an IIS rating of - 3 (adequate) to this inspection.

I met with the site internal regulator to discuss recent events on the site, ongoing inspections and future intervention topics. Two entries on the ONR issues database were reviewed by the ONR Civil Engineering Specialist. I attended the site stakeholder group meeting and held information exchange meetings on a number of topics including a recent event on site during testing of a Nitrogen supply line, commissioning of the gas circulator lube oil foam system and permissioning of the new Nitrogen plant.

The licence conditions were inspected against ONR's published guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides).

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. No actions were raised during this inspection.