Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Inspection of the Fuel Route

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd's (NGL's) Hinkley Point B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I (the nominated site inspector) carried out compliance inspections against licence condition (LC) 22 (modification or experiment on existing plant), 23 (operating rules) and 24 (operating instructions). I also held a number of information exchange meetings with site personnel.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable - no safety system inspections were carried out on this visit.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For LC22 (modification or experiment on existing plant), I was satisfied that suitable processes were in place to provide assurance that the modification of the gas circulator lubricating oil fire detection and suppression system was being well managed. I therefore assigned an IIS rating - 2, (good) to this inspection.

For LC23 (operating rules), I concluded that that there was adequate evidence to support the underpinning of the Technical Specifications for the fire protection systems and that compliance with the arrangements for operating rules was demonstrated. I therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3 (adequate) to this inspection.

For LC24 (operating instructions), I was satisfied that site had followed procedures and developed a satisfactory instruction to address the reactivation of a foam protection system following a fire, and that compliance with the arrangements for operating instructions was demonstrated. I therefore assigned an IIS rating of - 3, (adequate) to this inspection.

Finally I held information exchange meetings with station staff on a range of topics including unplanned automatic reactor trips, interim outage and 2015 statutory outage preparations, reactor cooling water event, reviewed the actions/commitments and issues on site, protestor action, reviewed progress with the new vaporiser auxiliary boiler plant and the scenario for the annual emergency exercise level 1 demonstration.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. No actions were raised during this inspection.