Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 - Planned intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Nuclear Generation Limited's (NGL) Heysham 2 (HYB) power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 2 Intervention Plan. The compliance inspection and information exchange meetings were carried out by two specialist mechanical engineering inspectors and a project inspector. Two Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA) representatives attended as observers in line with the ONR/INA joint protocol agreed practice.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

We undertook a safety case informed system based inspection [SBI-19] of the Heating and Ventilation (H&V) Systems. The inspection sampled compliance against several licence conditions. These were LC10 (training), LC23 (operating rules), LC24 (operating instructions), LC27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits), LC28 (examination, maintenance, inspection and testing) and LC 34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste). Following review of the system, it was judged that the H&V plant was not applicable for inspection against the requirements of LC27 as no claims are made within the safety case associated with safety mechanisms, devices and circuits.

The objective of the inspection was to determine whether the licensee's arrangements for plant operational limits, plant maintenance schedules, staff training requirements and inspection plans were adequate in accordance with safety case requirements.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Inspectors judged that the arrangements and their implementation, associated with H&V Systems, met the requirements of the safety case and are adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From an LC10 perspective, staff training records and profiles were judged to be in accordance with the post training profile requirements. Therefore, we judged the LC10 element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an associated Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) rating of 3 - Adequate.

From an LC23 and LC24 perspective, based on the evidence sampled during this inspection, the implementation of the technical specifications, commentaries, and schedules were judged to be consistent with the claims presented within the Heysham 2 Station Safety Report (SSR) for the H&V and associated systems. The licensee demonstrated adequate knowledge and understanding in the areas of the safety case and how they relate to the operating rules and instructions in place for the H&V systems. We judged the LC23 and LC24 element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an IIS rating of 3 - Adequate.

From an LC28 perspective, the licensee demonstrated that there are adequate processes, procedures and records in place for the examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of nuclear safety significant areas of plant. Several samples were taken and suitable records were produced for each sample. We judged the LC28 compliance element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an associated IIS rating of 3 - Adequate.

From an LC34 perspective, the licensee demonstrated that containment is being appropriately maintained and that radioactive material and waste management is in compliance with the licensee's arrangements. We consider that the LC34 element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an associated IIS rating of 3.

The licence conditions were inspected against ONR's published guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides).

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence sampled, witnessed and collected during the inspection against LCs 10, 23, 24, 28 and 34, the mechanical engineering aspects for this system based inspection meet the requirements of the safety case and its implementation is considered adequate.

A number of observations were made as a result of this system based inspection associated with relevant good practice for the routine maintenance of the H&V system, which have been raised and will be addressed as part of the licensees condition reporting process. However, given that they are of minor nuclear safety significance, we are content that they will be addressed by the licensee in accordance with their own arrangements. There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.