Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 1 Level 4 Hazards meeting and plant inspection (one of a series of interventions) to monitor the progress at the hazards safety cases

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This report covers a level 4 hazards meeting and site inspection which was carried out on the 20-21 May 2014 at Heysham 1 (HYA) power station. The site inspection was carried out by Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) specialist internal hazards assessors accompanied by the assigned site inspector to address several aspects related to development of the HYA / HRA (Hartlepool) hazards safety cases. This meeting was one of a series of interventions regarding the development of the hazards safety cases.

The purpose of this intervention was for EDF Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) to discuss progress made on the HRA Hazards Safety Case project and to provide an update to ONR on the issues raised by the case. The meeting was held at the HYA site to enable an inspection of the plant following the level 4 meeting.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This hazards intervention covered a routine Level 4 meeting with NGL with respect to progress on the HYA/HRA overall hazards case and associated cases. The intervention was a useful update on the NGL interpretation of as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and how this is being applied when carrying out modifications to plant to improve its resilience against hazards.

The intervention included a plant inspection and observation of those plant areas where modifications have taken place, are due to take place or where further safety studies are being carried out to provide additional justification of the current hazards safety case.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The meeting provided a useful update of the hazards safety cases currently being produced by NGL. Some of the cases delivery dates have been missed due to the number of individual safety cases and the modifications that they subsequently drive.

There were a number of minor issues related to plant condition identified on the plant walk around and, in my opinion, the licensee's plan to deal with these issues was adequate. Most of the issues were recognised by the station via an orange defect tag. There appeared to be a lot of these tags and while defect tagging should be encouraged, it would appear that the station needs to take control of the situation. I discussed this with the site inspector and he explained that ONR has already raised an issue on the issues database about defects in general and he is pursuing it as part of normal business.

Conclusion of Intervention

This was an open honest and useful intervention where we were given an update on the progress of the hazards safety cases.

Although the delivery dates for the many of the cases is slipping, I believe that the licensee is correctly prioritising the cases that present the highest level of risk, and the modifications which provide the greatest risk reduction are being implemented as soon as practicable.

We were given an update as to when we should expect to see certain cases, this helps with resource planning in ONR. Regular level 4 progress meetings should continue every 6 months to monitor the licensee's progress with these cases