Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hartlepool Intervention Plan

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This is a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL) Hartlepool Power Station, undertaken as part of the planned integrated intervention strategy (IIS) for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP).

The inspection was performed by the ONR Operating Reactor Delivery Lead and the Nominated Site Inspector.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions (LCs):

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

LC 28 - The reactor 1 statutory outage has proceeded to plan and NGL have reported no anomalous results.  ONR specialists have completed their inspections and report no issues which would prevent start up.   With the exception of two technical specification violations the conduct of the outage had, at the time of the start-up meeting, been good.  The success of the outage will largely be determined by the upcoming return to service phase.  I judge the arrangements under LC 28 to be adequate, rating 3.

LC 23 – The on-site preparations for returning reactors 1 and 2 to service at reduced temperature were found to be systematic and consistent with the safety case and the stations arrangements.  Appropriate operating rules were being developed to manage the operation of the reactor within the envelope required by the safety case. I judge the application of arrangements made under licence condition 23 to be adequate, rating 3.

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Hartlepool.