Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Reactor 1 (R1) 2014 Statutory Outage: Control and Instrumentation (C&I) Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This intervention report covers my control and instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as part of an ONR civil nuclear reactor programme (CNRP) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) during the outage of Reactor 1 (R1) at Hartlepool (HRA) Power Station. The main focus of my inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at HRA.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

My inspection was in support of ONR’s 2014/15 Statutory Outage inspection programme. The outcome of my inspection, which included a review of progress made regarding various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at HRA, covered NGL’s arrangements under Licence Conditions LC12 (Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons (DAP and SQEP)), LC22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant), LC27 (Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits) and LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). My inspection is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR’s regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow R1 at HRA to return to normal operating service.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This inspection has found that the commitments made in the HRA R1 Outage Intensions Document (OID) for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety have been satisfied. My inspection of the work activities covered during this intervention has found that the workmanship applied was adequate and consistent with the standards expected from C&I SQEP personnel.

I have raised nine actions during the inspection, one of which requires resolution prior to return to service of Reactor 1. All nine actions have been captured within the ONR Issues Database.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

On the basis of my inspection of the C&I aspects of the HRA R1 outage, I recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R1 at HRA to return to normal operating service pending the satisfactory resolution of the one return to service action contained within ONR Issue 2852.

Based on the findings of my inspection against LCs 12, 22, 27 and 28, I have assigned an integrated intervention strategy (IIS) rating of 3 (adequate) to LC 12, 22 and 27. As a consequence of recent work undertaken at HRA on the laddic system I have assigned an IIS rating of 2 (good standard) to LC28.