Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Hartlepool Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This is a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited's (NGL) Hartlepool Power Station, undertaken as part of the planned integrated intervention strategy (IIS) for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP).

The inspection was performed by the ONR Structural Integrity Lead and the Nominated Site Inspector.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions (LCs):

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The reactor 1 outage continues to deliver the agreed scope; none of the results received so far would prevent return to service. I found the implementation of their LC 28 arrangements in this area to be adequate (rating 3).

The specialist structural inspector found the implementation of boiler spine developments on both reactors to be adequate. (LC 22 rating 3, adequate).

Bringing this double reactor outage to a successful conclusion poses an unprecedented challenge to the station and is placing heavy demands on the station staff. I believe the station have organised their internal resources as well as possible in the circumstances. I found the implementation of arrangements under LC 36 to be adequate (rating 3). However, I have requested a record of overtime worked by EDF staff at Hartlepool over the last 6 months to confirm this.

Conclusion of Intervention

The areas examined were found to be adequate.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Hartlepool.