Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Mechanical Engineering Inspection of maintenance conducted during Hartlepool Unit 1 2014 periodic shutdown

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This report records the findings of my intervention visit to Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station during the 2014 Unit 1 periodic shutdown. The intervention was undertaken to confirm the adequacy of mechanical engineering related activities conducted by the Licensee to comply with the requirements of Licence Condition 28, examination, inspection, maintenance and testing against a sample of nuclear safety significant reactor components.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The intervention consisted of on-site meetings and a plant inspection with relevant staff from EDF Energy Nuclear Generation (NGL) to determine the adequacy of the work being undertaken on Unit 1 in complying with the requirements of Licence Condition 28. The activities examined were selected due to their nuclear safety significance and included:

The inspection was supported by visits to the following areas:

The licence conditions were inspected against ONR's published guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides).

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From the sample of Control Rod Assembly maintenance reviewed, I consider that the Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing [EIMT] arrangements are adequate, the performance against the schedule is being achieved and the records supporting the tasks confirmed compliance with arrangements and completion of the tasks consistent with the expectations of LC28.

From the sample of Gas Circulator maintenance reviewed, I consider that the EIMT arrangements are adequate, the performance against the schedule is being achieved and the records supporting the tasks confirmed compliance with arrangements and completion of the tasks consistent with the expectations of LC28.

From the sample of gas Safety Relief Valve maintenance reviewed, I consider that the EIMT arrangements are consistent with previous undertakings, performance against the schedule is being achieved and the records supporting the tasks confirm compliance with arrangements and completion of the tasks consistent with written instructions.

Inspection of CRMMR confirmed an adequate standard of housekeeping was being achieved with suitable foreign material exclusion [FME] arrangements in place. Minor improvements were identified and captured on a condition report for NGL review. Equipment obsolescence was proving a challenge in maintaining equipment capability, but I judge does not directly affect nuclear safety.

Inspection of the GCMF confirmed an adequate standard of housekeeping was being achieved, consistent with the workshop at near capacity with GC's and the limited space available. FME controls were evident and no significant challenges uncovered with respect to loose components or items left outside of tool control arrangements.

The samples selected were representative of mechanical engineering work pertinent to supporting the issuing of Consent to restart the reactor. During the inspection the work and procedures sampled were found to be generally adequate and completed to appropriate standards.

Conclusion of Intervention

This report presents the findings of the Mechanical Engineering intervention of the maintenance arrangements in place to comply with LC28 for the Hartlepool Unit 1 2014 periodic shutdown.

After consideration of the findings from the intervention I judge that the LC28 arrangements in place are adequate and I am satisfied they are being adequately implemented.

From a Mechanical Engineering perspective, I find no significant areas of concern relating to nuclear safety and support a consent for return to service of Hartlepool Unit 1 upon completion of the outage commitments identified in Outage Intention Document HAR/MO/R/020/219.