Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Dungeness B Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B (DNB) power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The key interventions during this inspection were for licence compliance covering the following licence conditions:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Findings from the LC4 Inspection of the New Fuel Store revealed that record management of fuel movements was acceptable, but there appeared to be weaknesses in the production of criticality safety notices, and the compliance with the criticality safety certificates.  I judged that the shortfalls in both cases were unlikely to lead to an incident and therefore rated the inspection outcome as below standard.  I have placed actions on the site to review all of its criticality safety notices for consistency with the criticality safety certificates and to review compliance with all of its criticality safety certificates.

Inspection against Site’s LC 6 arrangements, for evaluation of Station’s Records Schedule, identified documents which had exceeded their review date and issues over document retention, given requirements set out in this licence condition.  In some cases, I also found it difficult to identify which records needed to be kept. It was therefore agreed that Station would review and update the Station Records Schedule.  I concluded that compliance with LC 6 was below standard.

Inspection of Site’s LC28 arrangements focused upon station’s administration process to demonstrate work has been completed.  In general, I considered the system used was suitable and sufficient, but noted that I considered some processes for recording and demonstrating completion of work to be unusual.  However, I judged that they were acceptable and I rated the compliance with LC 28 as adequate.

In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety on the station at this time.  Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.