This is a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd's (NGL's) Dungeness B (DNB) power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
At the time of this intervention, DNB Reactor 21 was on its periodic shutdown (also known as its statutory outage). Since this statutory outage was approximately at its half way point, we (nominated site inspector and ONR's Reactor 21 periodic shutdown project inspector) held a mid-outage walkdown and a mid-outage meeting.
A significant amount of physical work takes place during a statutory outage, much of which is undertaken by contractors. Some of this work involves hot working and/or confined space working. Because of this, we considered statutory outage conventional health and safety.
I (nominated site inspector) attended a Site Stakeholder Group (SSG) meeting.
I conducted a walkdown of the current sea flooding defences and an inspection of plans to finalise these, primarily by construction of a rock armour wall and concrete apron behind the shingle bank. The walkdown included an inspection of the new flood wall around the site and local flood protection of a key cooling system.
This intervention included planned information gathering, part of which was the follow up of incidents on the site.
In relation to the mid-outage walkdown and the mid-outage meeting, we identified no significant issues. Several actions were placed for information to be provided in the start-up meeting information pack, or at the start-up meeting itself.
In relation to statutory outage conventional health and safety, we considered that this was being adequately managed. The safety centre was a focal point and its establishment since the last statutory outage is considered to have had a positive effect. Conventional health and safety incidents during the periodic shutdown to date were of low severity. Both the Industrial Safety Engineer and the Joint Secretary for the Safety Representatives demonstrated positive challenge during a plant tour.
In relation to improvement of the sea flooding defences, I concluded that satisfactory progress was being made and that plans to finalise these were reasonable.
In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.
The licence conditions were inspected against ONR's published guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides).
From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety on the station at this time. Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.