Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Dounreay Cranes 25.4t SWL Sphere Goliath Crane, D1100, Dounreay Fast Reactor DFR & 27t SWL Crane, D2700, Dounreay Cementation Plant DCP

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This report covers the system based inspection of two Dounreay cranes; the Goliath crane in the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) and the 27 t crane in the Dounreay Cementation Plant (DCP).  The inspection was undertaken as part of a programme of planned interventions that are listed in the Dounreay Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

The inspection was undertaken by an ONR Site Inspector and a Technical Specialist from AMEC Foster Wheeler. The aim of the inspection was to confirm the adequacy of the implementation of the safety case with respect to the two cranes.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The inspection included planned compliance inspections for the two cranes against the following licence conditions (LCs), with the aim of forming an overall judgement regarding compliance with the safety case:

The inspections were based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements in place against each licence condition. Meetings were held with key site personnel and the main findings of the discussions were communicated.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

The operation and maintenance of both cranes was considered by ONR to fulfil the requirements of the safety case.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Overall compliance with each of the LCs was adequate in the areas inspected:

Training records are held in an electronic data base (SAP).  Training requirements for all operational lifting-related posts are well-defined.  Each facility was able to demonstrate that operator experience was also tracked, although different local systems were used in each facility.

Operating rules are identified in the safety case and in the limits and conditions document for each facility.  The limits and conditions document is subject to an appropriate level of due process if changes are required.  There is, however, no periodic review of this document.

Operating rules specific to each crane are contained in the crane operating instructions. The operating instructions themselves are appropriate for the uses to which the cranes are put.

Key SMDC are identified and tested in the pre-use start conditions for the DCP crane; none exist for the DFR crane.  The SMDC are maintained as part of the facility’s wider LC 28 maintenance programme.  The facility has never had to defeat any SMDC but if they needed to do so they would follow the licensee’s modifications process.

Maintenance records for both cranes indicated that adequate maintenance had been carried out to satisfy the requirements of the safety case and of LOLER.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this intervention, I do not believe there are any matters that may impact significantly on nuclear safety. All license conditions assessed have been rated as adequate, IIS rating 3. No additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions for Dounreay as set out in the IIS.