Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Outage R1: Control & Instrumentation (C&I) Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This Intervention Report covers my Control and Instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as a part of an ONR Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) intervention, applicable to EDF Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDFNGL) during the outage of Reactor 1 at Torness (TOR) Power Station. The main focus of my inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that this remains fit for its intended purpose at TOR.

Interventions carried out by ONR

My inspection was made in support of ONR's 2013/14 Statutory Outage inspection programme. The outcome of my inspection, which included a review of progress made in various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at TOR, covered EDFNGL's arrangements under Licence Conditions 27 (Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits) and 28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). This is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR's regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow R1 at TOR to return to normal operating service.

Key findings, Inspector's opinions and reasons for judgements made

This report presents the findings of my C&I inspection activities carried out during the R1 statutory outage at TOR Power Station. These activities have included review of the Outage Intentions Document (OID), a sampled inspection of outage related maintenance activities, and inspection of outcomes following relevant INF1 events raised from 2012 to date. My inspection of the C&I related work activities covered during this intervention has found that the standards of workmanship meet my expectations and is consistent with the standards expected from a C&I suitably qualified experienced person.

Conclusion of intervention

From the evidence gathered during this C&I inspection, I identified no significant matters that may impact on nuclear safety. I have not found any significant issues in relation to the C&I equipment and systems that should prevent ONR from issuing a Consent to allow R1 at TOR to restart.


On the basis of my inspection of the C&I aspects of the R1 outage, I recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R1 at TOR to return to normal operating service.