Observation of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited Transport Emergency Exercise Treebridge
- Site: Non-site specific
- IR number: 19-088
- Date: October 2019
- LC numbers: N/A
Purpose of Intervention
This intervention was carried out under The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 (CDG) as amended, Schedule 2 Radiological Emergency, Section 5: Review and Testing of Emergency Plan, to observe EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) implement its transport emergency arrangements.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The intervention evaluated all elements of NGL’s transport emergency arrangements:
- Radsafe response to provide initial advice and monitoring for emergency services at the scene of the event;
- Setting up an Emergency Control Centre (ECC) at consigning site following notification from National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC) of a transport radiation emergency;
- Setting up Barnwood Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) to take over from consigning site’s ECC, providing advice and support as well as develop recovery plan.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
This was not a System / Structure Based Inspection
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
It was considered that NGL adequately implemented its transport emergency arrangements with all elements responding to the event. Some observations made indicated that control room protocol in the NGL Barnwood CESC could be improved by personnel clearly identifying their role, improved briefing, and clarity in status board information.
It was considered that the development of the recovery plan was rushed with no evidence gathered to address the following elements:
- Whether the carrier had been contacted, decontamination of vehicle and its recovery;
- How CDG Schedule 2, Section 10 Packages involved in a radiation emergency had been assessed;
- Information on recovery plan to indicate how drums would be decontaminated and if over-packs were available for damaged drums.
Conclusion of Intervention
It was considered NGL had adequately demonstrated the implementation of its transport emergency arrangements and that, in general, the exercise objectives had been met with possible improvements identified as:
- Strengthening control room protocol in the CESC for a transport radiation emergency,
- Carry out a review of CESC procedures to ensure transport requirements are clearly identified, this also linking into changes from CDG amendment regulations,
- Consider repeating recovery plan phase as this process appeared rushed and a number of interactions and requirements appeared to have not been covered.
These findings will be tracked by ONR. There were no significant issues identified hence the inspection has been rated Green.
There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions as set out in the 2019/20 Integrated Intervention Strategy.