Oxygen Inspection readiness inspection - Human Factors
- Site: Heysham 1
- IR number: 19-095
- Date: October 2019
- LC numbers: N/A
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of this inspection was to assess the readiness of EDF Heysham 1 and BOC personnel to commence blended oxygen / carbon dioxide injection at the Heysham 1 site. The purpose of this activity is remove carbon deposits on the fuel and thus reduce fuel failure rates. The intervention scope was limited to Human Factors (HF).
The inspection was undertaken on the 3rd October 2019 and is the final inspection of a series of multi-disciplinary inspections undertaken to inform ONR’s permissioning of this activity. It follows two previous HF inspections: a factory acceptance test inspection performed at BOC and a previous readiness inspection at Heysham 1 which included HF elements.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The scope of the inspection is summarised below.
- Inspection of training process, material and competence assessment.
- Examination of the procedures and confirmation that the equipment design supports reliable human interaction.
- Inspection of the task design, conduct of operations, and command and control appears to be fit for purpose.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
The key findings from this inspection comprise:
- Training and Competence: I found that the training material and subsequent competence assessment process to be fit for purpose. Bespoke training has been developed for all stakeholders and is suitably wide ranging in scope, referencing the safety case, and covering normal and fault conditions including the appropriate response. EDF also recognise the issue of currency and the impact the project delays have had and have taken measures to address this via continuation training / briefings. Testing and commissioning activities have also played a dual role in testing the equipment and the operators as part of on-the-job training. Competence assessment has been via a combination of exam and task assessment. Exam questions are suitably testing and cover both task activity knowledge, safety case requirements, hazard awareness, and what to do post fault. At the time of inspection, approximately 95% of personnel had completed the training however I am assured that this will be 100% complete before the activity commences.
- Procedures: Procedures have demonstrably improved since the previous versions observed during factory acceptance testing. It was clear effort has been put into reducing the amount of surveillance checks to optimise operator workload. I advised that a few minor changes could be made to further enhance the procedures.
- Task and Equipment Design: Inspection of the equipment and the sample of commissioning activities – start up / gas mixing found no areas for concern. Good practices were observed in number of areas.
Conclusion of Intervention
To conclude, I judge that EDF and BOC have demonstrated that the risk from Human Error appears suitably controlled so far as is reasonably practicable. EDF will consider implementing the identified enhancements to the procedures and pre-job brief for future injection activities. These enhancements will be tracked by EDF’s internal regulator.
I have made three minor recommendations are made to enhance the usability of the operational procedures and the efficacy of the pre-job briefs for any potential future injection campaigns. These recommendations do not impact on the current campaign.