Hartlepool - Reactor 2 Periodic Shutdown 2019 - Civil Engineering LC28 inspection
- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 19-061
- Date: August 2019
- LC numbers: 28
Purpose of Intervention
Under Licence Condition 30(3) the licensee, EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL), require consent from the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to start up Hartlepool Reactor 2 after a periodic shutdown. This intervention has been undertaken to inspect the civil engineering aspects of the Reactor 2 pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel outage inspection and maintenance programme.
The intervention is in accordance with ONR’s planned inspection programme for the Hartlepool 2019 Reactor 2 Shutdown – Regulatory Station Outage Plan.
Intervention Carried Out by ONR
This intervention evaluates compliance against License Condition 28 (Examination , inspection, maintenance and testing) by sampling the following activities:
- The appointed examiner’s (APEX) inspections and examinations of the Pre-stressed Concrete Pressure Vessel.
- Activities associated with pre-stressing tendon load checks, strand removals and examinations.
- Activities associated with the Boiler Closure Units (BCUs) including the Engineered Structural Retaining system (ESRs), Refurbishment of wire winding Change of Load Indicators (CoLIs).
- Pressure Vessel Cooling System (PVCS) leak searching and sealing.
- NGL supervision and oversight of contractors.
- Quality Assurance records, including Contractors Risk Assessments, Method Statements (RAMS) and plant calibration certification records.
The main purpose of the intervention is to provide evidence in support of the Appointed Examiner’s judgement on whether the Pre-stressed Concrete Pressure Vessel remains adequate for continued operation, until the next planned outage. This intervention will therefore inform a further Assessment Report on the civil engineering aspects of the Reactor 2 outage, return to service.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
Overall I judged from the sampled activities and records provided that:
- The examination, maintenance, inspection and testing activities for the pre-stressing, leak searching and sealing activities were being carried out in accordance with adequate arrangements. The arrangements sampled were comprehensive and detailed. Both the Licensee’s supervisory staff and the contractor’s staff demonstrated a high degree of understanding of the requirements and importance of the work being undertaken.
- The Licensee demonstrated adequate control and supervision of the pre-stressing contractor and the two contractors associated with leak detection and sealing. My judgement is based on the documented procedures sampled, the regular contact I observed between the NGL supervisors and APEX, and the contractor’s supervisors and their staff together with discussions I held with both the licensees and contractors staff on site.
- I judge that the Appointed Examiner carried out an appropriate degree of independent oversight of the pre- stressing activities. My judgement is based on detailed discussions with the APEX and on sampling the APEX Branch instructions. The Branch Instructions have been produced to a high standard; the APEX demonstrated a thorough knowledge of their requirements and was implementing them appropriately.
- I consider that the tendon selections for load testing and withdrawal were adequate and through discussion with the APEX that the selection followed a logical and reasoned process.
- I observed good working practices on site and in the methods employed.
Based on the findings I judge that the inspection rating against License Condition 28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) in accordance with ONR Assessment Rating Guide Table to be Green.
Conclusion of Intervention
There are no Issues from this inspection that would significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change is necessary to the planned interventions and inspections at Hartlepool as a result.
The Observations raised were considered to be minor and would not affect the ongoing planned activities.
This intervention was carried out early within the outage although sufficient areas of substantial work were already being undertaken.
The findings of this intervention record together with my subsequent assessment report will inform ONR’s decision whether to issue consent for start- up of the reactor on completion of its 2019 statutory outage.