Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hartlepool - Reactor 2 Periodic Shutdown 2019 - Civil Engineering LC28 inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

Under Licence Condition 30(3) the licensee, EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL), require consent from the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to start up Hartlepool Reactor 2 after a periodic shutdown. This intervention has been undertaken to inspect the civil engineering aspects of the Reactor 2 pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel outage inspection and maintenance programme.

The intervention is in accordance with ONR’s planned inspection programme for the Hartlepool 2019 Reactor 2 Shutdown – Regulatory Station Outage Plan.

Intervention Carried Out by ONR

This intervention evaluates compliance against License Condition 28 (Examination , inspection, maintenance and testing) by sampling the following activities:

The main purpose of the intervention is to provide evidence in support of the Appointed Examiner’s judgement on whether the Pre-stressed Concrete Pressure Vessel remains adequate for continued operation, until the next planned outage. This intervention will therefore inform a further Assessment Report on the civil engineering aspects of the Reactor 2 outage, return to service.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Overall I judged from the sampled activities and records provided that:

Based on the findings I judge that the inspection rating against License Condition 28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) in accordance with ONR Assessment Rating Guide Table to be Green.

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no Issues from this inspection that would significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change is necessary to the planned interventions and inspections at Hartlepool as a result.

The Observations raised were considered to be minor and would not affect the ongoing planned activities.

This intervention was carried out early within the outage although sufficient areas of substantial work were already being undertaken.

The findings of this intervention record together with my subsequent assessment report will inform ONR’s decision whether to issue consent for start- up of the reactor on completion of its 2019 statutory outage.