Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Operational Standards Compliance Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This inspection on the Capenhurst licensed nuclear site was undertaken as part of a programme of planned inspections, as outlined in the Capenhurst inspection plan for 2018/19. The scope of the inspection is aligned to the ONR Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste sub-division strategy and focussed on leadership and management for safety, organisational structure, reporting culture and effective operational experience feedback, as documented within the inspection topic areas of the strategy.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

During this inspection, I carried out an Operational Standards Compliance Inspection against the following licence conditions: LC 7 Incidents on Site, LC10 Training; LC17 Management Systems; LC26 Control and Supervision of Operations; and LC36 Organisational Capability.

Throughout this inspection, I sought to gain evidence that:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

N/A.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I judged that the licensee was able to demonstrate compliance through its written arrangements with LC 7 and LC 17 from the sample of arrangements inspected and the staff interviewed during the inspection.

I found that the Licensee has arrangements to ensure that details of incidents affecting safety on the site are notified to ONR and has written arrangements to ensure the appropriate categorisation system is used. 

I judged that senior managers create an environment of open reporting and are supportive and honest with staff and stakeholders promoting an open culture to support both learning from experience and internal challenge. From interviews with staff and managers, I was provided with the evidence to support my opinion that an active reporting culture, recording and investigating and identifying and implementing corrective actions to prevent recurrence i.e. effective OEF processes, were in place.

I judged that UUK could demonstrate that its organisational structure, staffing and competencies are currently suitable and sufficient to manage nuclear safety and that it has processes in place to assess organisational change, in accordance with its arrangements.

Conclusion of Intervention

In my opinion, the Licensee's arrangements for compliance with LC 7,10,17,26 and 36 were adequate from the sample of arrangements inspected and the staff interviewed during the inspection.  I therefore conclude that there are no matters that may impact significantly on nuclear safety.