This report concerns one of a series of planned ONR interventions in relation to the 2018 statutory outage of Reactor 2 (R2) at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Torness Power Station. It included an inspection of the radiological protection (RP) arrangements that the licensee had in place for the outage, and a Start-up meeting with Station management.
The aim of the radiological protection intervention was:
The purpose of the start-up meeting was for NGL to present the findings to date of the Torness (R2) 2018 periodic shutdown to ONR. The shutdown of R2 has been undertaken in compliance with their Nuclear Site Licence Condition 30 (LC30).
As Nominated Site Inspector I participated in all parts of this intervention. The RP inspection was led by two ONR specialist inspectors. This inspection sampled the following through interviews, document review and plant visits:
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
The outage meeting comprised a walk-down of relevant parts of the site, followed by a presentation by NGL and discussion.
Also recorded here is a follow-up meeting to view progress with LC11 – emergency arrangements, following an inspection in May 2018.
Not applicable – no system based inspection was undertaken.
The RP sample inspection did not reveal any significant nuclear safety concerns relevant to the R2 outage that require action by the Licensee or further follow-up by ONR.
Discussions with the Head of Radiological Protection (HoRP) at the Station indicated their strong commitment to effective radiological protection practice and a good level of compliance with the IRR17 was evident during plant inspections.
An inspection rating of Green was therefore assigned against IRR17.
The RP inspection identified no matters that should prevent ONR granting a Consent under licence condition 30 allowing the Licensee to return R2 to power in due course. The inspection team raised one regulatory issue concerning clarification of EDF NGL’s arrangements to ensure adequate staff response to fire and nuclear emergency alarms during reactor vessel entry. Advice was given concerning other potential areas for improvement, which the site undertook to respond to.
The start-up meeting also identified no areas of concern that would postpone R2 start-up, recognising that there was still some work still to be completed.
The LC11 emergency arrangements follow-up identified progress and further areas for discussion.