Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 - Reactive Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to observe the licensee’s Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA) Rapid Trending Review (RTR) team inspection which was carried out during the second week of Heysham 2 Reactor 7’s statutory outage. During the RTR, I elected to undertake reactive inspections against LC26, control and supervision of operations and LC28, examination, inspection, maintenance and testing.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I, the nominated site inspector observed INA’s RTR team inspection for the reactor 7 (R7) periodic shutdown. During the RTR I undertook reactive compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions (LCs) :

Part of the intervention was observed by a Japanese regulator from the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) which was used as information gathering for widening international regulatory experience.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

The Heysham 1 and 2 nominated site inspectors and the Hinkley Point B site inspector attended the Local Community Liaison Committee.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable - no system based inspections were completed during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For the RTR, I found the methodology to be comprehensive with good focus on nuclear safety and the need to consider the impact of activities on the adjacent operating reactor, R8.  The RTR team consisted of nine individuals with good representation from a broad range of specialists.

I noted that there was good focus on prior preparation and consultation with station in advance of the review.  The scope of the areas covered by the RTR team was large, the areas for inspection were targeted and informed by experience from previous RTRs undertaken at Heysham 2 as well as from the fleet. I accompanied several INA RTR team members on separate plant inspections.  I found that their approach to individuals to be good, as was the line of interviewing approach.

The findings from the RTR team were presented to the station.  The key findings were:

In light of the above findings the station has raised Condition Reports to track their progress.

For the reactive LC26 and 28 compliance inspections, I examined the licensee’s arrangements with respect to how the station’s control and supervision and EIMT activities were being managed and controlled for the Reactor 7 statutory outage activities. My sampled inspection covered the following areas

During the course of the reactive LC26 and LC28 compliance inspections, I sampled several activities being undertaken by Heysham 2 staff, contract partners and third party contractors. From my observations and engagements with the individuals concerned. I noted areas of good practice for the setting of individuals to work; I also noted good adherence to inspection procedures and the recording of maintenance task activities. Based on my sampled inspection, I judge that the following inspection rating of Green is appropriate for both LC26 and LC28.

Conclusion of Intervention

Following the LC 26 and 28 compliance inspections I the judged that compliance with LC26 an LC28 met ONR’s expectations and hence assigned an inspection rating of Green.

There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.  At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions of Heysham 2 power station as set out in the integrated intervention strategy, which will continue as planned for the R7 periodic shutdown.