Reactor 2 2018 Statutory Outage Civil Engineering LC 28 Inspection
- Site: Heysham 1
- IR number: 18-068
- Date: July 2018
- LC numbers: 28
Purpose of Intervention
Under Licence Condition 30(3) the licensee, EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) requires consent from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to start-up Heysham 1 Reactor 2 after a periodic shutdown. I have undertaken this planned intervention to inspect the civil engineering aspects of the Reactor 2 pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel inspection and maintenance programme.
This intervention was in accordance with ONR’s planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 1 Reactor 2 2018 Periodic Shutdown Plan.
My intervention evaluated compliance with Licence Condition 28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) by sampling the following activities:
- Pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel Appointed Examiner’s inspections and examinations;
- Pre-stressing tendon load checks and tendon strand examinations;
- NGL supervision and oversight of the pre-stressing contractor;
- Training, competency and quality records of the pre-stressing contractor
The main purpose of the examinations, inspections, maintenance and tests is to provide evidence in support of the Appointed Examiner’s judgement on whether the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel remains fit for continuing operation.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
Overall I judged from the sampled activities, my inspections and the records provided that:
- I was satisfied that the sampled examination, maintenance, inspection and testing activities were being implemented in accordance with NGL’s arrangements. I judged that these arrangements provided effective controls to maintain compliance with Licence Condition 28.
- The pressure vessel concrete was in an acceptable condition.
- The tendons selected for strand withdrawal were an adequate sample and that the condition of samples of the withdrawn strands that I inspected indicated that no structurally significant corrosion had occurred.
- The pre-stressing contractor’s supervisors and operatives were suitably qualified and experienced or being appropriately mentored.
- Adequate records of pressure vessel cooling water leaks were being maintained and sufficient effort was being expended to find and seal leaks, with the intent that the vessel returns to service with no active leaks.
- The Appointed Examiner was carrying out an appropriate degree of independent oversight of the pre-stressing and leak searching and sealing activities.
- The Appointed Examiner’s recommendations from the 2015 periodic shutdown have been substantially completed. NGL has adequate plans to address the outstanding recommendations, either prior to or shortly after return to service.
- ONR’s Regulatory Issue 4076, covering matters arising from its civil engineering assessment of the 2015 periodic shutdown, has been substantially addressed. I am satisfied that NGL has an adequate plan to address the single remaining action in a timely manner and that this outstanding action does not prevent ONR issuing consent to start-up Reactor 2.
Based on my findings I judge that the following inspection rating against Licence Condition 28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) is appropriate: Green.
Conclusion of Intervention
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change is necessary to the planned interventions and inspections at Heysham 1 as a result.
The findings of this intervention record and my subsequent assessment report will inform ONR’s decision whether to issue consent for start-up of Reactor 2 on completion of its 2018 shutdown. My intervention did not identify any matters that are likely to prevent ONR from issuing consent for start-up of Reactor 2.