Office for Nuclear Regulation

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INA Quarterly Meeting

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The main purpose of this intervention was to undertake reactive information gathering in relation to a recent incident reported on the West CO2 storage plant.  During this visit I, the nominated Heysham 1 site inspector, also undertook a number of other interventions including a site response to the fire alarm.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I had an information gathering meeting with the Event Recovery Manager and Deputy Operations Manager to discuss the West CO2 plant High Pressure (HP) heater incident reported on 30 May under INF 18/342.

I had a meeting with the site internal independent safety regulator to ensure regular communication and dialogue.

During my visit the site fire alarm was activated, following my muster to the fire assembly point I attended the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) to monitor the station’s response to the incident.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No system based inspection was undertaken hence, this is not applicable for this intervention.

Key Observations, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

My initial opinion on the West CO2 plant HP heater incident is that the causes are primarily associated with configuration control.  There does not appear to be direct parallels to the previous West CO2 plant incident (reported under INF 18/143).  I have asked the station to keep me informed of the status of the event recovery, return to service and their investigation findings.

A number of topics were discussed with the station INA assessor including intervention plans for 2018-2019 and the forthcoming Reactor 2 periodic shutdown.  The discussion was open and constructive highlighting areas of potential joint working and collaboration.

My opinion is that the site’s emergency response to the fire alarm incident was effective and appropriate.  The command and control I observed in the ECC was good including the situation awareness, focuses and corresponding actions.  The incident will be investigated in accordance with Licensee arrangements.

Conclusion of Intervention

From my visit and discussions held with the Heysham 1 station staff, there were no observations that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.  I raised no matters of significant concern that I consider require immediate regulatory action and no change is necessary to the planned interventions and inspections at Heysham 1 as a result. 

I will consider if further regulatory follow up is warranted for the reported incidents in accordance with ONR’s enforcement policy and guidance.