Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Dounreay LC compliance inspections (LC32 and LC34)

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This inspection was to undertake an inspection of the arrangements made to comply with Licence Conditions (LC) at Dounreay in accordance with the 2018/19 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the site, to confirm that the licensee is controlling its hazards and complying with its statutory obligations.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The purpose of this inspection was to examine DSRL’s arrangements made under LC32 [Accumulation of radioactive waste] and LC34 [Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste], and the implementation of those arrangements on the site, specifically at:

This inspection also provided the opportunity to conduct a plant walk-down of D2160 as part of the continuing schedule of inspection activities against the requirements of LC26 [Control and supervision of operations].

During the visit inspectors attended the Site Restoration Sub-Group meeting, the Dounreay Stakeholder Group meeting and the Dounreay and Vulcan Off-Site Emergency Planning Group.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

N/A

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

In respect of LC32 we focused on the arrangements in place to manage the production and accumulation of radioactive waste within the reactors, FCA and waste directorates. There is clear evidence of adequate management arrangements in place for the control of waste within each of the areas. We considered that each of the areas inspected demonstrated a good understanding of their waste inventory and requirements, and that the production, segregation and disposal of radioactive waste was appropriately managed.

In respect of LC34 we focused on the arrangements in place to manage the escape and leakage of radioactive material and radioactive waste within the reactors, FCA and waste directorates. There is clear evidence of adequate management arrangements in place for the detection, monitoring and reporting of leakage or escape within each of the areas. There was a clear link between the local documentation that we sampled and the corporate arrangements. Groundwater monitoring, conveniently located and clearly labelled spill kits, level alarms and bunds were all seen during plant inspections and demonstrate that the management arrangements are being implemented within each of the areas inspected.

This inspection provided an opportunity to conduct a plant walk-down within D2160. We observed activities associated de-cladding and drum transfer operations. In both areas we observed a clear demonstration of the control and supervision of these high hazard activities.  

Conclusion of Intervention

Overall, we consider that the arrangements and their associated implementation for both LC32 and LC34, for the areas inspected, met with the required standards. We did not identify any matter impacting on nuclear safety that required any further immediate regulatory action.