Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Wylfa Handover and Planned Licence Condition Compliance Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This intervention is part of a series of planned inspections for the year 2017/18, which is informed by the Decommissioning, Fuel & Waste (DFW) sub-division strategy.

I undertook this inspection to examine the adequacy of Magnox Ltd.’s (MxL) arrangements and their implementation on the Wylfa site for compliance with Licence Condition (LC) 10 (training), LC 12 (duly authorised (DAP) and other suitably qualified and experienced persons (SQEP)).  My inspection concentrated on staff associated with defuelling operations because I consider that timely safe removal of fuel to Sellafield will result in significant nuclear risk and hazard reduction on site.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I undertook my inspection in four phases, which consisted of:

In addition to the LC inspections I undertook a handover inspection with the outgoing Wylfa Office for Nuclear Regulation nominated site safety inspector.  The inspection included the following activities:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Based on the evidence examined it is my judgement that MxL is adequately implementing arrangements for complying with LC 10 and 12 at Wylfa. I identified a number of areas of good practice and a few areas where MxL could improve. For example, I considered that MxL has good processes for identifying that staff were SQEP to undertake activities important to nuclear safety.  I considered that MxL could improve the link between its LC compliance arrangements and departmental SQEP management and training instructions.

Conclusion of Intervention

I identified no matters that in my opinion could adversely affect nuclear safety.  My findings were shared with, and accepted by the licensee.


Pwrpas yr Ymyrraeth

This intervention is part of a series of planned inspections for the year 2017/18, which is informed by the Decommissioning, Fuel & Waste (DFW) sub-division strategy.

I undertook this inspection to examine the adequacy of Magnox Ltd.’s (MxL) arrangements and their implementation on the Wylfa site for compliance with Licence Condition (LC) 10 (training), LC 12 (duly authorised (DAP) and other suitably qualified and experienced persons (SQEP)).  My inspection concentrated on staff associated with defuelling operations because I consider that timely safe removal of fuel to Sellafield will result in significant nuclear risk and hazard reduction on site.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I undertook my inspection in four phases, which consisted of:

Examining a sample of Wylfa site’s LC 10 and 12 arrangements documents provided in advance by the licensee;

Obtaining evidence via discussions on site with ML staff;

Undertaking a site inspection of relevant site facilities; and

Sampling evidence provided by the licensee during my site inspection.

In addition to the LC inspections I undertook a handover inspection with the outgoing Wylfa Office for Nuclear Regulation nominated site safety inspector.  The inspection included the following activities:

Site familiarisation inspection, including primary and secondary defuelling routes, dry store four retrievals operations and waste operations.

I met with the site’s leadership team and key members of the maintenance, operations, waste and safety case departments.

I met with the site safety representatives.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Based on the evidence examined it is my judgement that MxL is adequately implementing arrangements for complying with LC 10 and 12 at Wylfa. I identified a number of areas of good practice and a few areas where MxL could improve. For example, I considered that MxL has good processes for identifying that staff were SQEP to undertake activities important to nuclear safety.  I considered that MxL could improve the link between its LC compliance arrangements and departmental SQEP management and training instructions.

Conclusion of Intervention

I identified no matters that in my opinion could adversely affect nuclear safety.  My findings were shared with, and accepted by the licensee.