Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Capenhurst UUK - System Based and Operational Standards Compliance Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This inspection on the Capenhurst licensed nuclear site was undertaken as part of a programme of planned interventions as outlined in the Urenco Capenhurst inspection plan for 2017/18.

The scope of the inspection was to confirm that the selected safety system fulfilled its safety function and adequately implemented the safety case.  The operational standards aspect of the inspection considered the leadership and safety culture within the facility, focusing on front-line activities associated with the selected safety system.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

During this inspection, I carried out a System Based Inspection on the Northey Pump High Pressure Trip System to ensure adequate implementation of the following licence conditions:

A review of the Radioactive Waste Management Case was also undertaken, in addition to the licensee’s compliance arrangements for LC32 and LC34.

Whilst on site, I also held meetings with the licensee to discuss and follow-up on the status of events and actions, held meetings to discuss a number of routine matters and engaged with the UUK safety representatives.

The inspection was carried out against the requirements of ONR's published inspection guidance associated with the above Licence Conditions for System Based Inspections.  The inspection comprised of plant inspection, office-based examination of procedures and records and interviews with staff.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

The inspection found that the system fulfilled its safety function and adequately implemented the safety case.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I carried out a System Based Inspection to assess the licensee’s implementation of LC10, 23, 24, 27, and 28, in relation to the Northey Pump High Pressure Trip System. During this inspection, I reviewed the licensee’s safety case and considered that it accurately represented the facility and identified the associated hazards and risks. In addition, I reviewed the leadership and safety culture within the facility, which I judged to be of a high standard.

I reviewed the training records for a sample of operational and maintenance staff. I found that all persons reviewed had current training records against all of the operating and maintenance instructions sampled during this inspection.

I reviewed the operating and maintenance instructions associated with the selected safety system. I found that the operating and maintenance instructions that I reviewed were clear and concise and identified references to the safety related equipment.  I noted that the associated EIM&T improvement programme had significantly improved all associated documentation in this area.

I judged that the licensee is undertaking suitable examination, inspection, maintenance and testing activities for the Northey Pump High Pressure Trip System.  All maintenance records sampled were within date, legible and signed by suitably qualified and trained personnel. The licensee also demonstrated that the plant was not operated, unless suitable and sufficient safety mechanisms, devices and circuits are properly connected and in good working order. I noted, however, that the EIM&T improvement programmes in this area are still being progressed and are required to be delivered in a coherent and timely manner.

I judged that UUK was able to demonstrate suitable arrangements for minimising the rate of production and total quantity of radioactive waste accumulated on the site.  In addition, UUK were able to demonstrate suitable arrangements for ensuring adequate control and containment of radioactive material and radioactive waste.

Conclusion of Intervention

Based on the evidence gathered during this inspection, I conclude that there are no matters that may impact significantly on nuclear safety.  The licensee has committed to taking action to address both the findings of this intervention and its own surveillance report, which builds regulatory confidence, particularly with regard to internal self-challenge. Any matters raised in this inspection will be monitored via routine regulatory engagement.