Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Trawsfynydd Planned Licence Condition Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This inspection was one of a series of planned inspections for 2017/18, which are informed by the Decommissioning Fuel and Waste (DFW) sub-division strategy.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I undertook this inspection to examine the adequacy of the licensee's arrangements and their implementation on the Trawsfynydd site for compliance with three Licence Conditions: LC 26 (control and supervision of operations); LC 28 (examination inspection, maintenance and testing); and LC 36 (organisational capability). I also received an update on the following activities:

I was accompanied during my intervention by an ONR leadership and management for safety specialist inspector. The inspector separately undertook an inspection to gauge aspects of the site's safety culture.

I also attended the Wylfa Site Stakeholder Group meeting as part of my role as the ONR Nominated Site Inspector for Magnox Ltd's (ML) Welsh region sites.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Based on the evidence examined it is my judgement that ML is effectively implementing arrangements for complying with LC 26 and LC 28 at Trawsfynydd. For both LC I identified a number of areas of good practice and a few areas where ML could improve. Overall I judged that the arrangements were adequate.

For LC 36 we identified a number of what we consider to be small gaps in the implementation of the arrangements that were sufficient for me to seek some improvement. These were conveyed to the licensee and will be followed up during future routine inspections.

The licensee confirmed that it has identified gaps in training of staff on site and that it was taking appropriate action to address the shortfalls.

During my site inspection I identified that two workers had activated the radiologically controlled area exit alarms. The licensee attributed the activations to naturally occurring radon contamination. I was satisfied with the evidence provided that there was not a safety concern that would require the licensee to take remedial action. I subsequently obtained the opinion of an ONR radiation protection specialist that supported my judgement.

Conclusion of Intervention

I identified no matters that in my opinion could adversely affect nuclear safety. My findings were shared with and an accepted by the licensee.