Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Torness - SBI28 Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to conduct a systems based inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s Torness nuclear power station.  The system in question was the Control Rod Shutdown System.  The inspection was done as part of ONRs series of planned interventions as set out in the Torness integrated intervention strategy for 2017/18.

The inspection was undertaken by the ONR nominated site inspector and two specialist mechanical engineering inspectors with the assistance of EDF Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I carried out a safety case informed ‘systems based inspection’ (SBI) of the control rod shutdown system.  ONR’s system based inspection process examines evidence to determine compliance against six key licence conditions (LCs).  These licence conditions have been selected to provide a structured approach to determining whether the safety case requirements of the system being inspected (in this case control rods) are adequately implemented.  The license conditions are: LC10 (training), LC23 (operating rules), LC24 (operating instructions), LC27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits), LC28 (examination, maintenance, inspection and testing) and LC34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste).

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

From the sampled evidence examined during this inspection, I judged that overall the safety provisions applicable to the control rod – shutdown system met the requirements of the safety case.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Torness nuclear power station demonstrated that it has arrangements in place to ensure that the control rod shutdown system is inspected, maintained and operated in accordance with its safety case.  The arrangements examined by ONR complied with NGLs legal duties in the areas sampled during the inspection.  The inspection identified potential areas for improvement; however none gave rise to significant concern.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the sampled evidence examined during this SBI 28 inspection against the nuclear site licence conditions 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, I consider that the control rod shutdown system met the requirements of the safety case.

There were no findings identified from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.