Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Sizewell B Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Sizewell B power station, in line with the planned inspection programme of the Operating Facilities Operating Reactors sub-programme intervention plan for 2017/18.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

During this intervention, I undertook compliance inspections against the following applicable provisions of the Energy Act (2013):

Also during this intervention:

I attended the outage intentions meeting for the Reactor Outage 15 (RO15), scheduled to commence on 3rd November 2017. During this meeting we discussed the station’s outage programme and schedule for requesting consent to return to service under Licence Condition 30;

I undertook a monthly review of safety matters with the station’s independent nuclear assurance evaluators, and conducted a general inspection of the reactor controlled area ;

I examined the status of the station’s portfolio projects to better understand the station’s investment priorities that impact on nuclear safety, and to assess the regulatory interface associated with these projects.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No system inspection was undertaken during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I made the following principal findings and observations against the requirements of LC 10 and LC 12:

It is evident the station has a mature framework for systematic approach to training management, embedded through its operations and technical training programmes accredited under the (INPO-derived) Training Standards Assessment Board (TSAB).

The number of ‘in-training’ roles (i.e. roles that have lapsed and awaiting completion of refresher training) has reduced from 450 three months ago to 114 following an improvement initiative. Whilst this has been positive in terms of progress, I emphasised the need for sustained focus from the station on ensuring training records are reconciled and aligned. A Level 4 regulatory issue has been raised to monitor progress.

The nuclear safety group training programme has been twice accredited through TSAB and is well established and supported by a dedicated curriculum review committee.

I examined the station’s arrangements for ensuring safety case authors and verifiers are appropriately trained and demonstrably competent. The station’s arrangements appear to be robust in ensuring coaching and mentoring of personnel towards being competent safety case authors and verifiers.

Records sampled for duly authorised person authorisations and their respective training were observed to be up to date.

In relation to RO15, we reviewed the station’s outage programme and agreed in principal a schedule of regulatory interactions towards a timely issue of consent to restart under LC 30.

During my inspection of the reactor controlled area, I observed a generally good standard of housekeeping and material condition of plant. I observed a number of minor defects that warrant attention through the station’s normal prioritisation process. The station has raised appropriate condition reports in each case.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

I consider that based on the evidence acquired during this inspection, the station is demonstrably compliant with its arrangements under LC 10 and LC 12, thus warranting an inspection rating of ‘Green’ in both instances.