Office for Nuclear Regulation

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LC11 Inspection of Sellafield Decommissioning Directorate and Pile Fuel Storage Pond Facility at Sellafield

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) undertakes all regulatory interactions with Sellafield Limited (SL, the site licensee) against a strategy defined by the ONR Sellafield Decommissioning Fuel and Waste Division.  My planned inspection schedule for the current regulatory year (covering April 2017 – March 2018), the content of which is guided by that strategy, identifies the Licence Conditions (LCs) that will be inspected over this period.

This planned intervention was undertaken to determine if the Decommissioning Directorate is adequately implementing SL’s site-wide arrangements and directorate specific arrangements for compliance with Licence Condition 11 (LC11 - Emergency arrangements). The intervention targeted the implementation of SL’s arrangements within Pile Fuel Storage Pond (PFSP) complex. This inspection is complementary to ONR’s inspection of SL’s site wide demonstration of compliance with LC 11 (site emergency exercises) that is led by ONR’s infrastructure inspector.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

LC11 requires the licensee to make and implement adequate arrangements for dealing with any accident or emergency arising on the site and their effects. 

My inspection, which comprised discussions with SL staff and examination of documentation focussed on the following areas:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable; this was not a Safety System inspection.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I consider the Decommissioning Directorate’s and PFSP’s implementation of the site’s arrangements for LC11 is good in some areas; for instance, in the recording and tracking of the exercise and drills schedule and use of the dashboard and Key Performance Indicator (KPI) reports.

These findings are, however, offset by a number of minor shortfalls. For instance the Sellafield Operator Emergency Plan (SLM 2.02.03 Issue 17) and supporting documentation should now be updated to reflect that there is a single nuclear site licence (as a recent change). The roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities profile for the PFSP security and resilience planners should also be reviewed and issued formally; I have raised a minor Regulatory Issue here to ensure timely completion of the action to close out this particular shortfall.

Consequently, on balance, it is my opinion that the licensee has adequately implemented its arrangements for compliance with LC11 and therefore I consider the inspection merits a rating of GREEN (No formal action).  

My findings were shared and accepted by both the Decommissioning Directorate and PFSP security and resilience staff.

Conclusion of Intervention

My findings were shared with, and accepted by the licensee as part of my normal inspection feedback. I have raised a minor Regulatory Issue as a result of this inspection to ensure the identified shortfall is effectively remedied.