Hinkley Point A nuclear licensed site planned system based inspection
- Site: Hinkley Point A
- IR number: 17-092
- Date: August 2017
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28 , 34
Purpose of Intervention
This was a system based inspection (SBI) of Hinkley Point A's (HPA) Sludge Canning Building (SCB) Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) waste management project. This was one of a series of planned inspections for 2017/18.
We also met four of HPA's Safety Representatives.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
We undertook an SBI, which considered the interaction between the HPA management and the Magnox Ltd waste management project team in their preparations to take responsibility for decommissioning the SCB. The interaction was assessed against the requirements of the six licence conditions attached to the nuclear site licence addressing:
- Training of staff;
- The safety cases for operations in the building;
- The operating rules and operating instructions arising from the safety cases;
- Safety mechanisms that would mitigate incidents in the building;
- Maintenance of equipment in the building; and
- Control and containment of radioactive waste in the building.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
From the discussions we held, the inspection of the SCB and the information provided by the site and the waste management project team, we concluded that the transfer of responsibility for the safe decommissioning of the building from the site to the project team was being managed adequately.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
We found that:
- Training (LC10) was adequate for the SCB decommissioning programme because we found evidence that training needs had been assessed against staff experience and where there were shortfalls there were training plans in place to bridge the gap.
- Safety cases and their operating rules (LC23) were applied adequately. For example, we found the project team understood the safety case needs, which will drive the operating rules for SCB decommissioning. This was significant as the SCB had a history of minor incidents from decommissioning work. Consideration of key SCB risks was also demonstrated.
- Operating instructions (LC24) were adequate. We found evidence that showed recent operating experience was being incorporated into instructions and a further systematic review of instructions was planned as part of the decommissioning activities.
- Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits (SDMCs) including passive structures (LC27) were correctly identified.
- Maintenance (LC28) had been adequately undertaken by the site team, and the project team will take ownership during decommissioning activities. Planned maintenance was minor during care and maintenance.
- Control and containment of radioactive waste (LC 34), appeared adequate. For example, we found evidence that the project team plans to upgrade the active ventilation system, while maintaining the existing passive systems.
Conclusion of Intervention
We concluded from our intervention that the arrangements and the knowledge transfer were adequate for transfer of responsibility for decommissioning the SCB from the site team to the project team.