Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Hinkley Point A nuclear licensed site planned 2017-18 inspections and meetings

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This was one of a planned series of inspections at the Hinkley Point A site in accordance with the inspection plan for 2017/18.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I inspected implementation of the arrangements made under Licence Conditions for marking the site boundary, restrictions on nuclear matter on the site, incidents on the site and organisational capability.

I also received updates on progress with projects related to ILW management, preparations for demolishing the turbine hall and on asbestos remediation.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

I did not undertake an inspection of a safety system during this visit to the site.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Licence condition (LC) 2 requires Magnox Ltd to make and implement adequate arrangements to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the HPA nuclear licensed site. Magnox Ltd must also mark the boundaries of the site by fences or other means and such fences or other appropriate means used for this purpose shall be properly maintained. I walked the length of the boundary and confirmed the licence condition was met.

I found that the clarity of the HPA's current arrangements for restrictions on nuclear matter on the site could be improved. In my opinion this was not a significant matter as no ILW was due to be transferred to HPA. I suggested to the Deputy Site Closure Director that Magnox Ltd considered making the necessary arrangements to meet the licence condition well in advance of any future ILW moves, should such moves be proposed. We noted that planning permission would also be required before HPA imported any ILW.

I reviewed a recent investigation undertaken by site into an incident on the site and noted there were aspects that could be improved in making the recommendations from the investigation clearer. HPA informed me of the importance of the programme involved in the incident having a key role in the investigation. This ensured buy-in of any recommendations. HPA also monitored progress with implementation of the recommendations and only removed the issues from the site's database when the site was convinced the implementation was adequate. As a result of this key role undertaken by the site I formed the view that HPA was meeting LC 7.

I asked about progress with reducing the radioactive hazards on the site. I was told and saw evidence that since my last inspection, HPA had made progress in a number of areas, including preparations for using concrete boxes for the long-term storage of ILW.

Conclusion of Intervention

HPA adequately met the nuclear site licence conditions that were relevant to current activities being undertaken in the areas I inspected. Where there were shortfalls identified the activity was either not taking place, or the technical shortfall will be easily and quickly rectified. I briefed my findings to the Site Management before I left the site.