Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Heysham 2 - Unannounced LC11 Compliance Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (EDF-NGL’s) Heysham 2 Power Station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Division (OFD) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in-line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 2 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) 2017-2018.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

As part of ONR’s intervention plans, a small number of compliance inspections are not formally identified on the plan, which allows these to be carried out in an unannounced manner.

An unannounced compliance inspection against LC11 (Emergency Arrangements) was carried out using the guidance provided within ONR document NS-INSP-GD-011 Rev 4 which requires that inspectors undertaking a compliance inspection against LC11 consider both the arrangements that are in place together with their associated implementation. The inspection was supported by the Heysham 2 Independent Nuclear Assurance Inspector (INA).

Part of this compliance inspection involved attendance at a joint Heysham 1 and 2 Emergency Arrangements Review Meeting (EARM) with the ONR Heysham 1 and the Civil Nuclear Security Inspector.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable: No safety system inspection was undertaken during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

My unannounced  LC11 compliance inspection of the station’s emergency arrangements for  Heysham 2 consisted of the following:

Based on my sampled inspection, no significant shortfalls were identified that would undermine nuclear safety. However, I did observe some very minor areas where standards did not meet the licensee’s expectations. The Heysham 2 INA inspector stated that they would follow up the observations made and report back to me the outcome. 

The EARM was jointly run with Heysham 1 and 2 both the Heysham 1 and 2 nominated site inspectors and the ONR nuclear security inspector. My observations from the EARM demonstrated several aspects of the EPE role responsibilities being undertaken; these activities also included the preparations made for Level 1 safety and counter terrorism exercises and engagements with external stakeholders.

Conclusion of Intervention

Overall, I consider that the arrangements and their associated implementation for LC11 for the sample undertaken met with the required standards; I have therefore rated this inspection as Green.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety nor require a change to the planned interventions and inspections of Heysham 2.