Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Dungeness B - Engineering Governance

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

To evaluate EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Dungeness B's engineering department and central technical organisation governance arrangements. This forms one of a series of interventions to be carried out at all NGL's nuclear sites and corporate centre at Barnwood. This intervention is in accordance with the planned inspection programme contained in the Dungeness B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2017/18.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

The intervention used NGL's fleet engineering equipment reliability process as a platform to evaluate engineering governance. It used structured discussions with system engineers, engineering department group heads and Senior Managers as well as observation of a plant walk-down. Key focus areas were:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

As this was not a Safety System Intervention, no judgement was given.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Based on evidence gathered during this intervention ONR considered that compliance against LC 10 and LC 17 was met. This view was based on evidence that Dungeness B's engineering department were following required arrangements in ensuring that suitable training was provided for all those who have responsibility for any operations that may affect safety and that management systems give due priority to safety.

In the case of engineering governance, ONR considered adequate resources were in place to deliver Dungeness B's engineering department mission to manage equipment assets and prevent system failures impacting on safety and performance. In the case of training, it was recognised by the licensee that the knowledge management aspect for system handovers could be further strengthened through continued rollout of system specific route maps, system specific mentor guides and system specific handovers with managerial sign-off.

ONR considered that compliance with central fleet engineering processes such as system walk-downs and equipment reliability reviews was adequate. company technical standards (CTSs) are used as intended; however, compliance with company standards could be further enhanced by the use of systematic reviews or gap analysis of plant systems against technical guidance notes (TGNs).

Conclusion of Intervention

ONR's inspection considered that Dungeness B Power Station's Engineering governance processes provide sufficient oversight and the arrangements ensure suitable training is provided to engineering personnel. No significant issues were raised and we rated both LC17 (Management Systems) & LC10 (Training) Green.

There were no findings identified from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. We advised NGL of some opportunities to enhance process adherence and governance. NGL agreed to consider this advice and implement appropriate improvements.