Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Dungeness B - Planned Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd's (NGL's) Dungeness B power station. It was undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Division (OFD) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in-line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Dungeness B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

During this intervention, the following key activities were undertaken:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No system based inspection undertaken, hence not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

LC9 requires the licensee to ensure that every person authorised to be on the site receives adequate instructions on:

To ensure consistency in approach, EDF NGL has a written procedure explaining how this is achieved and how this supports controlled access to site.

I sampled two new recruits and found the training records to be complete in line with the company arrangements. I sampled one of the recruits' Job Induction and Orientation paperwork. This was being managed by the station's training department and aligned with the individual's job role. I did note a minor discrepancy relating to completion of an on the job training element. There were additional qualification certificates relating to this skill in the training file; therefore I judged the discrepancy to be an administrative error requiring no regulatory action.

The station has developed bite sized training videos to support the Statutory Outage. These were observed during the RTR and I enquired with EDF NGL employees and contractors during plant walk-downs what outage training could be recalled. From the discussions I found that the EDF NGL employees had discussed the videos during team meetings. The awareness of the outage safety messages amongst the contractors was variable and this was fed back to the Strategic Outage Manager so that leaders can reinforce these safety messages during the outage.

During participation of the RTR, I completed a safety walk-down with the RTR team and observed a number of work activities supporting the outage. A number of observations were made and fed back to the senior management team daily. I observed positive interactions between the station and the RTR team. The RTR found two Areas for Improvement and two Opportunities for Improvement. These will be captured in the Corrective Action Process and tracked to successful completion by INA.

I engaged with the senior management team on forthcoming improvement initiatives and operational focus. No significant nuclear safety concerns were raised during these discussions.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

In relation to LC9 compliance inspection, I judge the implementation of licensee's arrangements is adequate and meets relevant guidance. There were some opportunities for improvement noted, but no significant weaknesses were identified.