Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Compliance inspection at Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL)

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of this inspection was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) in accordance with the 2017/18 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for Dounreay to confirm that the licensee is controlling its hazards and complying with its statutory obligations.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention included an inspection of the Site's arrangements made under the following LCs:

The inspections were undertaken by the site inspector and were based on examining a sample of the licensee's arrangements and their implementation on site as follows:

This intervention included the follow up inspection against LC28 [Examination, Inspection, maintenance and testing] within the BFR project. This inspection closed out concerns raised during the LC28 compliance inspection conducted in September 2017.

This intervention also provided the opportunity to conduct a plant visit to DFR against the requirements of LC26 [Control and supervision of operations].

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate


Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The inspection against LC7 focused on the implementation of the corporate arrangements for the identification, capture, trending and implementation of lessons learned from site (and other external) events. In particular the arrangements in place to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of those lessons learned. The inspection also provided the opportunity to assess the arrangements in place for compliance against the expectations for the notification of incidents to ONR via the INF1 process.

There was clear evidence of an ongoing programme of company level initiatives and events to address a range of trends identified from on-site events and to promote the learning gained from these events. DSRL are also in the process of implementing a range of activities to improve their monitoring of the effectiveness of these initiatives.

Overall I considered that DSRL has adequate arrangements in place for the identification, recording, notification and reporting of incidents on the site.

The inspection against LC11 focused on the corporate arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements that support the requirements defined against Topic Area 1 [PROVIDE] of the Dounreay On-Site Emergency preparedness and Response (EP&R) Capability Map. The site provided a comprehensive suite of evidence that provided an adequate demonstration of the expectations set out against the various aspects covered by Topic Area 1 and demonstrated a proactive approach to the development of the future emergency response capability requirements against the changing hazard profile resulting from the site's decommissioning plan.

Overall I considered that each of the seven aspects covered within Topic area 1 of the Dounreay on-site EP&R capability map merited a regulatory rating of 1 [all nuclear safety requirements met]: This also provided a clear demonstration of their compliance against the requirements of LC11.

The follow up inspection against LC28 focused on the records supporting the recent scheduled maintenance period conducted within the BFR project. There was clear evidence of adequate records supporting the maintenance activities supporting safety related equipment; the ATO Holder has also implemented improved arrangements for the formal ‘hand-over' of equipment back to the facility on completion of maintenance activities. This inspection formally closes out the LC28 compliance inspection conducted on 13 September 2017 and further supports the adequate demonstration of their compliance against the requirements of LC28.

This inspection provided an opportunity to conduct a plant visit within DFR. During this visit I considered there to be a clear demonstration of adequate control and supervision of the operations observed ongoing within these areas.

Conclusion of Intervention

Overall, I consider that the arrangements and their associated implementation for LC7 and LC11 for the areas inspected met with the required standards. I did not identify any matter impacting on nuclear safety that required immediate regulatory action.