Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Planned inspection of Trawsfynydd

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was an inspection of Magnox Ltd's Trawsfynydd power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste (DFW) Programme of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Trawsfynydd Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).and Magnox Ltd Corporate IIS.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

Planned inspections of Licence Conditions (LCs) 7 and 22

The following meetings were also undertaken:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system based inspections were undertaken during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The arrangements made in compliance with LC22 were inspected with a focus on the process for flexible permissioning. The arrangements do provide for a flexible and proportionate approach to permissioning, and both the licensee and regulator have to follow the process. However the licensee agreed that it would be of benefit to improve the clarity of the process to ensure that both Magnox Ltd and ONR implement the process consistently. Also, an inspection of the implementation of LC22 arrangements was undertaken by sampling two modifications from a list of current submissions. In both cases Magnox Ltd provided comprehensive explanations of the purpose of the selected modifications and provided evidence of compliance with site specific and companywide arrangements. Based on the aspects of the arrangements sampled during this inspection and the evidence presented an inspection rating of green is assigned.

An inspection was carried out of the "SQEPness" of staff undertaking investigations for the purposes of LC 7 by examining a sample of investigations undertaken during the past 12 months. It was apparent that there were many competent investigators compared to the number of investigations undertaken annually, limiting the ability to maintain competency through utilising skills on the job. Training for some investigators had not been implemented, and the site were unable to demonstrate that people undertaking investigations met Magnox Ltd's requirements for being SQEP. The sample of investigation reports revealed the consequences of these shortfalls: for example, the tendency to focus narrowly on the specific incident without considering the wider learning for other areas of site operations. An inspection rating of amber is assigned and an issue has been raised to seek improvements in these areas.

The additional meetings undertaken to review current activities, issues and incidents provided positive feedback on the approaches to continuous improvement on the site.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the information obtained and evidence gathered during this intervention, I believe there were no issues identified that were considered to adversely affect nuclear safety.