This Intervention Report covers a Control and Instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as part of an ONR Operating Facilities Programme (OFP) intervention applicable to EDF Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDF NGL) during the Refuelling Outage 14 (RO14) at Sizewell B (SZB) Power Station. The main focus of this inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that it remains fit for its intended purpose at SZB.
This inspection was made in support of ONR's 2016 Statutory Outage inspection programme. The outcome of this inspection, which included a review of progress made in various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at SZB, covered EDF NGL's arrangements under Licence Conditions 12 (Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons), 22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant), 27 (Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits) and 28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). This is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR's regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow SZB to return to normal operating service.
No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.
My inspection found that the commitments made in the Sizewell B RO14 Outage Intentions Document for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety have been satisfied for those elements of work complete at the time of the inspection. My inspection of the work activities covered during this intervention has generally found that the workmanship applied was adequate and consistent with the standards expected from C&I suitably qualified and experienced persons (SQEP).
Five actions have been raised during the inspection, as identified within this record, to provide information in respect of replacement transmitters in future outages and information in regard resolving issues on the Polar Crane. Only one of these actions associated with the load monitoring equipment on the Polar Crane is a return to service issue.
From the evidence gathered during this C&I-based intervention, I believe there are no significant matters that may impact on nuclear safety. I have not identified any significant issues in relation to the C&I equipment and systems that should prevent ONR from issuing a Consent to allow SZB to restart.
On the basis of my inspections of C&I aspects of the SZB RO14 statutory outage it is recommended that support be given for a Consent to allow SZB to return to normal operating service.