Hunterston B planned intervention
- Site: Hunterston B
- IR number: 16-050
- Date: May 2016
- LC numbers: 2, 10, 21
Purpose of intervention
The purpose of this intervention was to undertake Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd's (NGL's) Hunterston B power station, in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hunterston B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2016/17.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions:
- LC 2 - marking of the site boundary
- LC 10 - training
- LC 21 - commissioning
I undertook a review of the station's progress against its existing regulatory issues. I also attended a monthly update meeting with the station Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA) evaluators.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable as no system inspection was undertaken during this intervention.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
In relation to LC 2, I:
- Examined the company and local arrangements for controlling access to the licensed site. I confirmed from the site plan that there are two principal areas not delineated by a fenceline. I confirmed through inspection that these areas are subject to appropriate signage that aligns to the company standard, and which is placed at regular intervals.
- Sampled the general condition of fenceline and surrounding areas of the licensed site in the vicinity of the Scottish power operated buildings within the boundary of the licensed site. The boundary fenceline which bounds 400kV, 132kV and 33kV sub-stations appears to be in a good state of repair. I confirmed the local arrangements adequately define the appropriate procedures for itinerant access to the sub-station compound area and for pass issue.
In relation to LC 10, I:
- Observed a simulator training exercise against the requirements of the company arrangements for exercise delivery and debrief. I observed demonstrable use of operator fundamentals from the trainee control room supervisor and trainee reactor desk engineers. The debrief was interactive, two-way, facilitative in nature and self-critical.
- Sampled records of simulator assessment for operators who have recently been authorised as duly authorised persons. I was satisfied that candidates for duly authorised persons are assessed to a suitable standard in accordance with the company arrangements.
- Reviewed the responsibilities of the operations manager, operations training group head and simulator instructors in relation to delivery of the operator training programmes and management of the simulator as a training asset. I observed that the station maintains appropriate links to fleet as evidenced through a planned benchmarking exercise at Torness in terms of developments to the second simulator unit. I was satisfied that the station has resilience in terms of this effective but vital training asset for the generating life that remains; and appropriate attention to fidelity issues.
In relation to LC 21, I:
- Examined station arrangements for scoping, delivering and governance of commissioning. I considered the local arrangements to be generally adequate and definitive in guiding the station to develop commissioning strategies and test schedules in a consistent manner. I identified that existing arrangements require updating particularly in line with recent developments in enhanced return to service procedures. A low level regulatory issue has been raised to capture this requirement.
- Sampled the progress being made towards delivering the foam fire suppression system, with particular emphasis on commissioning strategy. I am satisfied with progress being made and noted the development of a clear strategy for commissioning the system before the end of 2016.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Conclusion of Intervention
In relation to LC 2, I considered that an inspection rating of 'Green' is warranted on the basis that relevant good practice is generally being met, but with some minor shortfalls identified.
In relation to LC 10, I considered that an inspection rating of 'Green' is appropriate. This is on the basis that the arrangements for management and conduct of operations training are mature and align with internationally relevant standards. Re-accreditation by the INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operators) derived technical safety advisory board in March 2015 is further evidence that the operations training programmes are robust.
In relation to compliance with Licence Condition 21, I judge that an inspection rating of 'Green' is warranted on the basis that relevant good practice is generally being met, but with some minor administrative shortfalls identified.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.