Hinkley Point B (EDF Energy), Seawater Systems - Planned System Based Inspection (SBI 05)
- Site: Hinkley Point B
- IR number: 16-128
- Date: October 216
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34
Purpose of intervention
This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd's (NGL's) Hinkley Point B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Programme (OFP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
I (the nominated site inspector for Hinkley Point B) with support from the incoming nominated site inspector for Hinkley Point B and an ONR structural integrity specialist inspector:
- Carried out a system based inspection of the reactor seawater systems - focused on the reactor cooling water (RCW) system.
- Had introductory meetings with the Station Director, the senior executive and plant walk downs in support of the ONR nominated site inspector handover process.
The system based inspection of the reactor seawater systems was conducted against compliance with the following licence conditions:
- LC10: Training
- LC23: Operating Rules
- LC24: Operating Instructions
- LC27: Safety Mechanisms
- LC28: Examination, Inspection, Maintenance, and Testing
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides, which can be found at (www.onr.org.uk/operational/tech_insp_guides/index.htm) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Based on the inspection of the selected sample, we judged that the reactor seawater system met the requirements of the safety case and was adequate.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
From the System Based Inspection on the seawater system, we concluded that:
- LC 10 (Training) - Based on a sample review of the training records for staff involved in operation and maintenance associated with the seawater system, NGL's arrangements meet and in some instances exceed relevant good practice. In light of this, we judged an IIS rating of Green - No formal action, is merited.
- LC 23 (Operating Rules) - We inspected a sample of the records for compliance with the site's technical specifications and the underpinning documentation relevant to the seawater system and found these adequate. We did not place any actions relating to compliance with LC23, and thus judged an IIS rating of Green - No formal action, is merited.
- LC 24 (Operating Instructions) - Based on our inspection of a sample of operating instructions, the licensee demonstrated that adequate operating instructions were in place to reflect the requirements of the safety case. We did not place any actions relating to compliance with LC24, and thus judged an IIS rating of Green - No formal action, is merited.
- LC 27 (Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits) - We examined the calibration, testing and functional testing associated with the pressure transmitters and a non-return valve (NRV) on the seawater system. Through evidence, and discussions, the licensee demonstrated that sufficient safety mechanisms, devices and circuits were available. We did not place any actions relating to compliance with LC27, and thus judged that an IIS rating of Green - No formal action, is merited.
- LC 28 (Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing) - We examined records for inspections in the maintenance schedule for the RCW system. The licensee provided evidence that plant had been inspected, examined, maintained or tested within the time interval in the maintenance schedule. We did not place any actions relating to compliance with LC28, and thus judged that an IIS rating of Green - No formal action, is merited.
The system based inspection requires an assessment of the plant condition, which was based on discussions with the System Engineer and a walk down of the plant. The systems reflected the state of the plant described by the System Engineer, with areas of positive operational experience demonstrated. Overall the plant condition was judged to be acceptable.
To support the handover of site inspection duties (of the nominated site inspector), we held discussions with senior management, Independent Nuclear Assurance, visited a number of plant areas including the Emergency Control Centre (whilst a shift training exercise was ongoing).
Conclusion of Intervention
There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions of Hinkley Point B power station as set out in the integrated intervention strategy, which will continue as planned.