Hinkley Point B planned inspection
- Site: Hinkley Point B
- IR number: 16-031
- Date: May 2016
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34
Purpose of intervention
The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a system-based inspection of the ponds and flasks structures at Hinkley Point B power station, to attend a workshop on off-site emergency arrangements and to exchange information with site personnel.
The work was carried out in-line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The following interventions were carried out:
An ONR specialist civil engineering inspector and I carried out a system-based inspection of the fuel cooling ponds and flask handling crane. The intervention considered Licence Conditions 10 (training), 23 (operating rules), 24 (operating instructions), 27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits), 28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing), and 34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste).
I attended a workshop to assess the degree to which the existing Offsite Emergency Plan could be extended to mitigate the consequences of beyond reasonably foreseeable emergencies.
I also held information exchange meetings with site personnel.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
The ponds and flask handling crane were judged to meet the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
From the system-based inspection on the ponds and flasks we concluded that:
- LC 10 (Training) - We examined the role profile and training records of personnel involved in the maintenance and testing of the flask crane interlock and braking systems. We found that the personnel undertaking these maintenance and inspection activities were suitably qualified and experienced. We therefore assigned a rating of green (no formal action required) to this element of the inspection.
- LC 23 (Operating Rules) - The licensee's operating rules were contained within its Technical Specifications and were well defined for the ponds and flask systems we examined. Overall we were satisfied that the limits and conditions specified in the safety case had been correctly reproduced in the operating limits and that they were being monitored and controlled. We therefore assigned a rating of green (no formal action required) to this element of the inspection.
- LC 24 (Operating Instructions) - We reviewed a number of operating instructions including maintenance instructions and plant operating instructions and found them to be adequate. We therefore assigned a rating of green (no formal action required) to this element of the inspection.
- LC 27 (Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits) - We looked at two safety mechanisms, devices and circuits associated with the flask handling crane. We reviewed the safety functions required by the safety case together with the functional checks and maintenance that had been performed. We found that adequate arrangements were in place. We therefore assigned a rating of green (no formal action required) to this element of the inspection.
- LC 28 (Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing) - We reviewed the maintenance schedule, work instructions, work orders and inspection reports for the ponds and flask facilities. We also looked at the NGL arrangements for addressing any matters arising from the inspections. The evidence showed that the LC28 arrangements for the inspection, maintenance and testing of ponds and the flask handling crane were adequate. We therefore assigned a rating of green (no formal action required) to this element of the inspection.
- LC 34 (Leakage and Escape of Radioactive Material and Radioactive Waste) - We reviewed methods for detecting leakage from the storage ponds and reviewed the current leak schedule. We also discussed a recent event involving leakage of pond water into the Active Effluent Treatment Plant basement and we were satisfied that appropriate arrangements were in place. We therefore assigned a rating of green (no formal action required) to this element of the inspection.
Overall, we concluded that the arrangements and their implementation on the pond and flasks systems met the requirements of the safety case and were deemed to be adequate.
The extendability workshop considered the effects of a significant nuclear release beyond the existing emergency planning zone. The effectiveness of various mitigating actions were considered. A report on the outcome of the workshop is being prepared by NGL.
Finally I held a number of information exchange meetings with station staff to:
Gather information on a recent event where a contractor's computer did not undergo the correct procedures prior to its use on site.
To review the scenario for the next level 1 emergency demonstration exercise.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Conclusion of Intervention
There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions of Hinkley Point B power station as set out in the Integrated Intervention Strategy, which will continue as planned.