Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hinkley Point B planned inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a system-based inspection of the ponds and flasks structures at Hinkley Point B power station, to attend a workshop on off-site emergency arrangements and to exchange information with site personnel.

The work was carried out in-line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The following interventions were carried out:

An ONR specialist civil engineering inspector and I carried out a system-based inspection of the fuel cooling ponds and flask handling crane. The intervention considered Licence Conditions 10 (training), 23 (operating rules), 24 (operating instructions), 27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits), 28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing), and 34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste).

I attended a workshop to assess the degree to which the existing Offsite Emergency Plan could be extended to mitigate the consequences of beyond reasonably foreseeable emergencies.

I also held information exchange meetings with site personnel.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

The ponds and flask handling crane were judged to meet the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From the system-based inspection on the ponds and flasks we concluded that:

Overall, we concluded that the arrangements and their implementation on the pond and flasks systems met the requirements of the safety case and were deemed to be adequate.

The extendability workshop considered the effects of a significant nuclear release beyond the existing emergency planning zone. The effectiveness of various mitigating actions were considered. A report on the outcome of the workshop is being prepared by NGL.

Finally I held a number of information exchange meetings with station staff to:

Gather information on a recent event where a contractor's computer did not undergo the correct procedures prior to its use on site.

To review the scenario for the next level 1 emergency demonstration exercise.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions of Hinkley Point B power station as set out in the Integrated Intervention Strategy, which will continue as planned.