Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Planned system inspection and meetings at Hinkley Point A

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

I undertook inspections of Magnox Ltd's Hinkley Point A (HPA) nuclear licensed site as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Sellafield, Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste Programme of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). I was updated on progress with Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) decommissioning activities on the site.

I met a Safety Representative.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I sampled how the Magnox Ltd arrangements for incidents on sites (licence condition 7 (LC7)), emergency arrangements (LC11), management systems (LC17), examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (LC28), and decommissioning (LC35) were applied to activities on the site.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

I did not undertake an inspection of a safety system during this visit to the site.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

My LC7 compliance inspection was limited because HPA had not had a significant incident in recent times. The minor incidents that did occur were dealt with efficiently. I noted that the incident analysis methodology was applied to new activities to design out the risk of certain incidents.

For my LC11 emergency arrangements inspection I discussed the outcome of a recent internal exercise that showed the need for some improvements to ensure the contingency arrangements were appropriately applied. I was satisfied that the HPA management would make the necessary improvements.

During my inspection of management systems (LC17) HPA showed me how they control the quality and experience of work undertaken by persons from off the site.

HPA told me that the maintenance schedule needed to be updated to reflect completed decommissioning activities, changes resulting from the recent periodic safety review and changes due to the reduction in nuclear hazards on the site.

HPA reported that work to remove some of the asbestos hazards in the reactor buildings and their auxiliary buildings was being tendered and was due to commence early in the New Year. HPA also undated me on their proposals to modify some of their decommissioning proposals to remove some of the potential uncertainties.

Conclusion of Intervention

I believe there were no issues identified that would adversely affect nuclear safety arising from the information I obtained and evidence I gathered during this intervention. For the licence condition aspects I inspected, HPA met the requirements of the conditions.