The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Heysham 2 power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 2 Integrated Intervention Strategy for 2016/17.
This intervention included a compliance inspection against LC11 (Emergency Arrangements) using the guidance provided within ONR document NS-INSP-GD-011 [Emergency Arrangements]. This guidance requires that inspectors consider both the arrangements that are in place and their associated implementation.
I, the ONR nominated site inspector, undertook this compliance inspection against LC11 (Emergency Arrangements); I was supported by two ONR operational inspectors. This inspection was based on an observation of a site shift training exercise [Exercise Firebird Canberra] which covered the on-site emergency response arrangements at the Heysham 2 nuclear licensed site and, an inspection of a sample of the training records of two of the personnel involved in this training exercise.
This inspection also provided an opportunity to undertake a benchmarking exercise between Heysham 2 and Sizewell B power stations.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Not applicable: No safety system inspection was undertaken during this intervention.
The LC11 inspection examined the implementation of the station's arrangements via the observation of a shift exercise [Exercise Canberra]. The main components of the exercise included:
The inspection examined the following aspects of the arrangements:
Based on the evidence sampled I judged that the implementation of the arrangements for LC11reflect relevant good practice and warrant a rating of Green.
Overall, I consider that the arrangements and their associated implementation for LC11 for the sample undertaken met with the required standards; I have rated them as Green.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety nor require a change to the planned interventions and inspections of Heysham 2.