Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 - C and I Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This intervention report covers our control and instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as part of an ONR Operational Facilities Programme (OFP) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) during the 2016 statutory outage of Reactor 8 (R8) at Heysham B (HYB) Power Station. The main focus of our inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at HYB.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

Our inspection was in support of ONR’s 2016/17 statutory outage inspection programme. The outcome of our inspection, which included a review of progress made regarding various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at HYB, covered NGL’s arrangements under Licence Condition LC22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant) and LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). Our inspection was intended to provide a contribution towards ONR’s regulatory decision as to whether a consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow R8 at HYB to return to normal operating service.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This inspection sampled engineering procedures and records and found that, for the areas sampled, the commitments made in the HYB R8 Outage Intentions Document (OID) (TRIM 2016/119561) for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety have been satisfied.

We found that the Data Processing Systems (DPS) software modifications and safety systems alarm memory replacement were being suitably managed and documented.

We found the status and re-patching of the Channel Gas Outlet Temperature (CGOT) Thermocouples (T/C) and reactor in-vessel T/C were being suitably managed and documented. We also found that the status (connection/location) and management of Neutron Flux Detection (NFD) equipment was suitably managed and documented and arrangements for the examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of the samples reactor safety circuit instrumentation and gas circulator instrumentation were adequate.

A total of ten actions (level 4) were raised during the inspection, three of which we agreed with NGL that a Condition Reports (CR) would be raised. None of these actions are required to be addressed prior to return to service. All actions have been captured within the ONR Issues Database (4894) and will be monitored as part of normal regulatory business. The three actions which resulted in condition reports being agreed were:

We found that relevant good practice was generally met, with minor shortfalls identified, when compared with appropriate benchmarks. Therefore, based on the findings of our inspection we have assigned an integrated intervention strategy (IIS) rating of Green to LC22 and LC28.

Conclusion of Intervention

On the basis of our inspection of the C&I aspects of the HYB R8 outage, we recommend that support be given for a consent to allow R8 at HYB to return to normal operating service.