Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 - Licence Condition Compliance Inspection of LC21

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Heysham 2 Power Station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 2 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2016/17.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention was a compliance inspection against LC21 (Commissioning) using the guidance provided within ONR document NS-INSP-GD-021 [Commissioning]. This guidance requires that inspectors consider both the arrangements that are in place and their associated implementation.

I, the ONR nominated site inspector, undertook this compliance inspection against LC21 (Commissioning), I was supported by an ONR operational inspector and an ONR nuclear graduate. This inspection was based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements for LC21 in place at Heysham 2.

This intervention also included an opportunity to review the emergency planning and response (EP&R) capability map for Heysham 2, follow up on recent INF 1s raised by the station and a station plant walk with the technical safety and support manager (TSSM) covering several plant areas.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable: No safety system inspection was undertaken during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The LC21 inspection examined the implementation of the station's arrangements in support of two modifications to the existing plant:

The provision of a Carbonyl Sulphide (COS) Injection System to address carbon deposition within the fuel core and boilers.

The provision of variable speed drives (VSDs) to the gas circulation pumps as part of a broader strategy to address obsolescence and provide diversity.

The inspection examined the following aspects of the arrangements:

Based on my sampled inspection, I judged that the implementation of the arrangements for LC21 reflect relevant good practice and have rated this intervention as Green.

I reviewed the Heysham 2 capability map with the Technical Safety and Support Manager (TSSM) and the emergency response engineer. We identified areas where further information was required. We agreed that a 6 month periodicity was sufficient to enable the station to undertake periodic updates in order to complete a full review of the document in a 5 year period.

I followed up two Incident Notification reports (INF1's) with the Heysham 2 TSSM. No further follow up was required for one report. For the second investigation it had yet to be completed, I have therefore elected to await for this final report in order to determine if further follow up is required.

The plant walk with the TSSM covered the following areas:

On the plant walkdown I was satisfied that housekeeping was generally of a good standard. Several minor observations were made during the station walk which the TSSM has agreed to follow up.

Conclusion of Intervention

Overall, I consider that the arrangements and their associated implementation for LC21 for the sample undertaken met with the required standards; I have therefore rated this inspection as Green.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety nor require a change to the planned interventions and inspections of Heysham 2.