Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 compliance inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Heysham 2 power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 2 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions (LC):

The inspection undertaken utilised the following ONR guidance documents:

These guidance documents require inspectors undertaking compliance inspections against these LCs to consider both the arrangements that are in place together with their associated implementation.

As part of this intervention, I, the ONR Nominated Site Inspector, was supported by a transport inspector's for LC5 (Consignment of nuclear matter) and two specialist inspectors relating to fault studies and human and organisational capability for the LC7 (Incidents on site) element of the inspection. The inspections were based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements in place at the station against each licence condition.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

The site inspector also attended a number of routine meetings during the inspection. These included an ONR quarterly issues review meeting, the HEalth and SAfety Committee (HESAC) and the daily event screening meeting.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For LC5 we sampled into the arrangements and their implementation in the following areas:

Based on the evidence sampled during this inspection which involved inspection of the licensee's arrangements for LC5, we noted that NGL's primary implementation documents for LC5 should include definitions of what constitutes nuclear matter. An ONR issue has been raised for the licensee to review its corporate arrangements.

Notwithstanding this minor issue from our sampled inspection of the implementation of the arrangements at Heysham 2, we judged that the implementation of the LC5 arrangements is adequate and, therefore, have rated this element of the inspection through the IIS as Green.

For LC7, we sampled into the arrangements and their implementation in the following areas:

Our sampled inspection considered the corrective action review board, the corrective action programme, the continuous improvement department and nuclear safety group. Based on our inspection findings we judged that the implementation of the LC7 arrangements is adequate and, therefore, have rated this element of the inspection through the IIS as Green.

During my routine engagements I undertook a quarterly review of the ONR issues database was undertaken with the Heysham 2 Technical and Safety Support Manager. I did not identify any significant shortfalls or areas of significant concern such that they required elevation in relation to categorisation or further regulatory attention. Two issues were agreed to be closed; overall NGL continues to address the current open issues at Heysham 2 in a satisfactory manner.

I also observed the HESAC which was well attended by a wide range of Heysham 2 staff with contributions from all who attended and the daily screening meeting. In addition, I elected to follow up incident notification as part of the LC7 compliance inspection.

Conclusion of Intervention

Overall we considered that the arrangements and their associated implementation for LC5 and LC7, met with the required standard and was therefore was rated through the IIS as Green.

Notwithstanding this a single ONR issue has been raised to address minor concerns associated with improving the corporate primary implementation documentation for LC5.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Heysham 2.