Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 1 - Reactor 1 Outage - Works Management Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

To confirm Heysham 1 is coordinating Reactor 1 (R1) Periodic Shutdown maintenance to regulatory expectations.

 Intervention Carried Out by ONR

This inspection focused on confirming that maintenance activities for reactor core In-Service Inspection (ISI) and Boiler Quads were carried out in line with requirements of Nuclear Site Licence Condition (LC) 30: Periodic Shutdown and LC 26: Control and Supervision of Operations. Notably I inspected that:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

This was not a Safety System Based Inspection.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From my review of outage work programmes for ISI and Boiler Quads, line of sight between Station’s Safety Case claims, MS requirements and work instructions was confirmed.  This achieved by Station’s Asset Management System (AMS) with documentation attached to the AMS Work Orders identifying MS requirement and linking to Safety Case obligations (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) and work instruction activities confirming how the obligations are met.  I considered Licence Condition (LC) 30 requirements were met given documentation reviewed.

Based on my observations of Heysham 1 outage delivery organisation and work undertaken in support of R1 periodic shutdown, it is my opinion that work was carried out in line with work instructions.  My review of these documents concluded these are logical and contain suitable and sufficient information.  From my discussions with personnel carrying out work I consider they were SQEPed, demonstrating a good understanding of the work they were carrying out and held relevant experience based on their declared length of service.  I considered appropriate control and supervision was in place given the activities of NGL’s contract partner’s supervisory staff and NGL Field Engineers.  Inspection of work packs confirmed pre-job briefs had been undertaken with points raised from brief recorded on record sheet.  Daily setting to work briefs were undertaken using Time Out for Personal Safety (TOPS) reviews.  Quality requirements were identified within work instructions through hold-points and signed off by appropriate persons.  Quality requirements were also supported by NGL’s own quality surveillance outage programme.  Inspection findings demonstrated that requirements for LC 26 were met.

Some minor issues were identified in that some work cards did not reference work procedures used.  Work instructions could be streamlined by providing a single document.

Conclusion of Intervention

I consider requirements under LC 30 and LC 26 were being met.  Opportunities for improvement were updating and streamlining documentation to reduce bureaucracy and minimise potential confusion.


The Outage Group Head stated that he would consider inspection findings at the end of the outage and look to streamline and remove unnecessary bureaucracy.