Planned Compliance inspection at Hartlepool Power Station, EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited
- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 16-085
- Date: July 2016
- LC numbers: 27, 28
Purpose of intervention
The purpose of this intervention was to undertake planned compliance inspection activities at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited's (NGL's) Hartlepool power station in support of ONR's regulation of the 2016 Reactor 2 periodic shutdown.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
I undertook a planned licence condition 7 (incidents on the site) compliance inspection. I completed the final of a series of planned inspections to evaluate compliance with licence condition 26 (control and supervision of operations) during the periodic shutdown. I also met with NGL management to discuss other regulatory matters.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable - no system based inspections were performed during this intervention.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
- Licence Condition 7 - I reviewed NGL's incident database examining entries which occurred on at the Station during the period of the periodic shutdown. I am satisfied that those I sampled had been appropriately sentenced against ONR's INF1 reporting criteria. I reviewed NGL's response to an incident involving personnel contamination which occurred during operations to exchange a gas circulator. I am satisfied that NGL is applying its corrective action programme to identify learning from the incident. On this basis, I judge that the following inspection rating is appropriate: Green
- Licence Condition 26 - During a three week period, I have undertaken an intervention to evaluate standards of control and supervision during the periodic shutdown. The intervention examined: the effectiveness of procedures and method statements; procedural use and adherence and supervisor's presence at the work face. Overall, I am satisfied that the workers interviewed during the intervention understood the level of procedural use which applied to their work. During these interviews, personnel demonstrated an effective knowledge of the hazards, risks and principal control measures associated with their work. I judged the process used by the Station to appoint field supervisors to be effective and robust. Field supervisors and NGL responsible engineers were frequently observed to be present at the work face, providing control and oversight of NGL's contractors work during the periodic shutdown. Minor anomalies observed during the intervention (such as housekeeping issues) were raised with the licensee for resolution via NGL's corrective action programme. I judge that the following inspection rating against LC26 is appropriate: Green
Conclusion of Intervention
Based on the intervention undertaken against the requirements of the applicable legislation and guidance it is considered that the licensee had adequate arrangements in place.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine safety or which, in my opinion, would prevent restart of Reactor 2 following its periodic shutdown.