This intervention report covers our control and instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as part of an ONR Operational Facilities Programme (OFP) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) during the 2016 statutory outage of Reactor 2 (R2) at Hartlepool (HRA) Power Station. The main focus of our inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at HRA.
Our inspection was in support of ONR's 2016/17 statutory outage inspection programme. The outcome of our inspection, which included a review of progress made regarding various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at HRA, covered NGL's arrangements under Licence Condition LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). Our inspection is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR's regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow R2 at HRA to return to normal operating service.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
This inspection has found that the commitments made in the HRA R2 Outage Intentions Document (OID) for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety have been satisfied.
The identification of a computer during a plant walk-down at the R2 which had not been through the IT registration and antivirus scanning checks highlighted specific procedural weaknesses.
During the inspection there were a number occurrences where it was noted that some measurements undertaken during testing and maintenance activities appear to have failed the specified pass / fail criteria contained in work instructions, no indication was recorded on the documentation that the plant equipment had failed to meet the acceptance criteria, no corrective action was identified and no justification for continued use of this equipment was presented. We placed actions on NGL to investigate these incidences and we have asked the ONR Site Inspector to raise an issue on ONR's issues database for station to present their plans to improve the quality and reporting of C&I maintenance activities.
A total of four actions were raised during the inspection. One action (for NGL to identify what further cyber security measures are needed immediately, for the period of the R2 outage, to minimise the risk of further occurrences of unauthorised laptops being used on site) was complete prior to us leaving site. One action (for NGL to confirm a sweep of site has been undertaken to identify computers on site to ensure they had been through the due process for cyber security and any necessary nuclear safety measures are addressed prior to return to service) requires resolution prior to return to service of Reactor 2.
Outstanding actions have been captured within the ONR Issues Database.
Based on the findings of our inspection we have assigned an integrated intervention strategy (IIS) rating of Green to LC 28.
On the basis of our inspection of the C&I aspects of the HRA R2 outage, we recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R2 at HRA to return to normal operating service pending the satisfactory resolution of the one return to service action contained within Issue 2 (NGL to confirm a sweep of site has been undertaken to identify computers on site to ensure they had been through the due process for cyber security and any necessary nuclear safety measures are addressed prior to return to service).