The purpose of this intervention was to undertake compliance inspection activities at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited's (NGL's) Hartlepool power station in line with the ONR's planned inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2016/17.
Assisted by an ONR Project Inspector, I undertook an intervention to evaluate implementation of the licensee's arrangements made in accordance with licence condition 12 (duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons). This licence condition requires nuclear site licensees to make arrangements to ensure the competence of staff undertaking roles important to nuclear safety.
I undertook an intervention to evaluate the licensee's response to the discovery of a maintenance schedule anomaly and findings of the site's pipework inspection programme. I also met members of NGL staff to review the progress of other regulatory matters on the site.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Not applicable - no system based inspections were performed during this intervention.
I reviewed NGL's arrangements for management of Duly Authorised Persons and concluded that they are consistent with relevant good practice. I evaluated the application of NGL's LC12 arrangements based on a sample inspection and am satisfied that the licensee was able to demonstrate the competence of staff undertaking roles important to safety. I judge that these arrangements are effectively implemented at Hartlepool and award the following IIS rating: Green.
Under its arrangements made in accordance with licence condition 7 (incidents on site), NGL reported to ONR that it had failed to complete the calibration of a set of pressure switches. I reviewed NGL initial response to this incident I am content that NGL has taken appropriate immediate action to restore compliance. I am satisfied that the NGL are undertaking an appropriate internal investigation to identify the causes of this incident and learning to support continuous improvement. Overall, I judge the following IIS rating against LC 7 is appropriate: Green
I undertook follow-up enquires to gather information into the circumstances surrounding the discovery of corrosion within the Station's CO2 Storage System pipework. I am satisfied that NGL have responded appropriately to this incident and has sought appropriate specialist advice to underpin its justification for continued operation. ONR is already undertaking an intervention to monitor the effectiveness of NGL's fleet wide Corrosion Managing Programme. I judge that no changes to this intervention strategy are required.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change is necessary to the planned interventions and inspections at Hartlepool as a result.