Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

Dungeness B - Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Programme (OFP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in-line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Dungeness B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

During this intervention, the following key activities were undertaken:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

From our inspection, we judged that the CO2 Processing and Blowdown System met the requirements of the safety case.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From the System Based Inspection on the CO2 Processing and Blowdown System we concluded that:

I followed up on a number of regulatory issues and a recent ONR reported event.  No significant safety concerns were raised and I confirmed that the station was taking appropriate action.

The meeting to discuss the superheater header safety case was informative and no new information has been revealed through the development the case.  The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss the permissioning process and raise any technical queries.  Further engagement will be conducted as part of the permissioning process.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

The system based inspection resulted in areas of improvement being identified in response to compliance shortfalls relating to plant EIMT and training. Regulatory issues have been raised in order to seek improvement within areas of identified shortfalls. After considering all of the evidence presented by EDF NGL we concluded that the arrangements and their implementation, associated with the CO2 Processing and Blowdown System met the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.  However, given shortfalls identified with respect of LC10 and LC28, an IIS rating of Amber (seek improvement) is considered to be appropriate for this intervention.

There are no findings from these interventions that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.