Dungeness B - Planned Intervention - SBI03
- Site: Dungeness B
- IR number: 16-151
- Date: October 2016
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34
Purpose of Intervention
This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Programme (OFP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
The work was carried out in-line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Dungeness B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
During this intervention, the following key activities were undertaken:
- System based inspection (SBI) of the Boiler Feed System (BFS).
- Discussion on a recent event investigation.
- Discussions in preparation for the forthcoming outage intentions meeting.
- Engagement with senior leadership team.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
From our inspection, we judged that the Boiler Feed system met the requirements of the safety case and was adequate.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
From the System Based Inspection on the BFS we concluded that:
- LC 10 (Training) – We examined the training records of a number of personnel involved in maintenance and inspection activities associated with the BFS. We judged that the personnel undertaking these maintenance and inspection activities were suitably qualified and experienced. We therefore assigned a rating of Green (no formal action) for LC 10 compliance.
- LC 23 (Operating Rules) – The technical specification adequately specified the limits and conditions of operation (LCO) reflecting those specified in the safety case. In addition the surveillance records and compliance check sheets demonstrated that the technical specifications were adhered to during BFS operations. We therefore assigned a rating of Green (no formal action) for LC 23.
- LC 24 (Operating Instructions) – We examined a number of station operating instructions (SOIs), maintenance instructions (MI) and (PIOIs). We judged these documents to be of an adequate standard and therefore assigned a rating of Green (no formal action) for LC 24.
- LC 27 (Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits) – The Back – Up Feed System (BUFS) and Additional Feed System (AFS) were considered as a safety related systems. We examined and confirmed that they were adequately maintained and tested on a regular basis. We judged that a rating of Green (no formal action) was appropriate for LC 27.
- LC 28 (Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing) – We examined a number of maintenance instructions and work order cards. We confirmed that the periodicity of maintenance activities was appropriate and the maintenance instructions appropriately completed. We judged that the BFS plant and equipment was being adequately maintained. We therefore assigned an IIS rating of Green (no formal action) to this inspection. We observed minor compliance shortfalls relating to plant equipment during the plant walk-down. Remediation actions were agreed with EDF NGL and regulatory issues have been raised to track completion.
- LC 34 (Leakage and Escape of Radioactive Material and Radioactive Waste) – This LC was not applicable to this system, however during our safety case discussions the licensee commented that monthly checks are conducted on the condensate from the BFS.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides, which can be found at ) in the areas inspected.
Conclusion of Intervention
The system based inspection resulted in areas of improvement being identified in response to minor compliance shortfalls relating to plant condition. Two level 4 regulatory issues were raised in order to monitor the agreed remedial action. After considering all of the evidence presented by EDF NGL we concluded that the arrangements and their implementation, associated with the BFS met the requirements of the safety case and were adequate. An IIS rating of Green (no formal action) is considered to be appropriate for this intervention.
From the evidence obtained during the additional regulatory interventions, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety or protection of the public in the event of an emergency on the Station at this time.