Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Planned inspection at Urenco UK Limited's Capenhurst site

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection at Urenco UK Limited's Capenhurst site, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Sellafield, Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste Programme within the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The intervention included compliance inspections against the following Nuclear Site Licence Conditions (LCs):

These inspections included sampling of the compliance arrangements that were in place and seeking confirmation that these arrangements are adequately implemented.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

From my review of documentation, database and discussions with UUK staff I judge that an intervention rating of Amber (seek Improvement) is appropriate for LC10/12. This rating is judged appropriate as UUK were unable to demonstrate that any of their DAPs have been reappointed on a three yearly basis as required by their management system during the inspection. Issues have been raised on the ONR issues database.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I undertook a planned licence condition inspection against LC 36 for Organisational capability. From my review of documentation, databases and subsequent discussions with UUK staff I am content with the implementation of LC36 arrangements at Capenhurst. Therefore an intervention rating of Green (no formal action) for LC36 is judged appropriate.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

From my sampling of the UUK arrangements relating to DAPs they are considered adequate. At the time of the inspection UUK was unable to show any records demonstrating that it's DAP capability had been reappointed after a three year period as required by its management system. This shortfall applied to all DAP post holders who had been in post for more than three years. Subsequently UUK have demonstrated that they have sufficient DAPs to ensure safe operations. UUK have proposed An acceptable recovery plan. This shortfall is therefore rated as Amber (Seek Improvement). The Licensee recovery programme proposes an acceptable way forward ensuring nuclear safety. Issues have been proposed for ONR to follow up on this shortfall which will go through ONR's issues management process.

The inspection covered areas associated with Organisational Capability where I am satisfied from the activities sampled and from evidence gathered during this intervention, that I have seen no evidence of issues that could significantly impact on nuclear safety at Capenhurst.